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 Balancing Regulation and Rights in 
Venezuela’s Media War 
MOLLY CARNEY1 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE VIOLENT PHOTOGRAPH BAN 
On Friday, August 13, 2010, the front page of prominent 
Venezuelan newspaper, El Nacional, featured a photograph of piled-up 
bloody bodies at an overcrowded Caracas morgue.2 The graphic photo 
depicted about a dozen dead bodies, many naked, lying on stretchers 
and the floor.3 It accompanied a story about Venezuela’s rise in violent 
crime, and in particular, the country’s high homicide rates.4 Another 
opposition newspaper, Tal Cual, republished the photograph the 
following Monday.5   
Government actors responded quickly. The National 
Ombudsman’s Office claimed that the photograph unduly upset children 
and adolescents.6 Venezuelan police officers searched the El Nacional 
newspaper office, allegedly in order to gain more information as to 
when the photo was actually taken.7 President Hugo Chávez called the 
photo “journalistic pornography.”8   
The Tuesday after the photo was published, August 17, 2010, a 
Caracas court banned all of the nation’s newspapers from publishing 
 
 1. Attorney, Chicago, Illinois; J.D. (2012), Washington University in St. Louis School of 
Law; B.A. (2009), Northwestern University.  I wish to thank Professor Frances Foster for her 
invaluable guidance and encouragement. 
 2. See Dan Molinski, Grisly Photo Stirs Venezuela Voters, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 21, 2010), 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703579804575441921817476204.html; Simon 
Romero, Venezuela, More Deadly than Iraq, Wonders Why, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/americas/23venez.html?pagewanted=1; 
Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB., 
http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=363622 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 3. Romero, supra note 2.  
 4. Id. See infra notes 159163 and accompanying text (citing Venezuela’s high homicide 
rates). 
 5. See Molinski, supra note 2.  
 6. See Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2. 
 7. Venezuelan Police Search Newspaper Office, LATIN AM. HERALD TRIB., 
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=363737&CategoryId=10717 (last visited Nov. 22, 
2010).  
 8. See Molinski, supra note 2. 
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violent photographs for the next thirty days.9 The court partially 
reversed its ruling on Thursday, August 19, 2010, limiting the ban to the 
two newspapers that had run the photo.10 Each ruling asserted that a ban 
was a necessary measure to protect the nation’s children from moral and 
psychological harm and to protect the nation’s safety.11   
Voices on both sides of the debate characterized the photo and 
court rulings as political moves in advance of upcoming legislative 
elections.12 The two newspapers that published the photograph are 
known voices of opposition to President Chávez.13  Chávez maintained 
that the photo, which had actually been taken eight months before, was 
a scare tactic by the opposition to attract voters for the elections.14 The 
opposition papers and Western news outlets portrayed the ban as not 
only a political move to silence them before the elections, but also as an 
infringement of free expression.15 Following the court ban, El Nacional 
featured the word “CENSURADO” (“CENSORED”) in place of a 
front-page photo accompanied by the headline, “[t]hey’re prohibiting 
publishing images and news about violence.”16 The text further 
maintained that the paper would have published a photo of a father 
crying for his murdered son but for the recent censorship.17 Venezuelan 
media members such as Tal Cual’s editor, Teodoro Petkoff, publicly 
criticized the ban.18 International news organizations were highly critical 
 
 9. Id. See also Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2 
(“For the next four weeks, no newspaper, magazine or weekly of the country can publish images 
that are violent, bloody, grotesque, whether about crime or not.” The court planned to issue a 
more definitive ruling a month later, on September 17.). 
 10. Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Venezuela, PRESS REFERENCE, http://www.pressreference.com/Uz-Z/Venezuela.html 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2010). El Nacional is considered Venezuela’s “second most important 
newspaper” after the slightly more conservative El Universal. Although the paper supported 
Chávez in the 1998 presidential election, its political views have since moved towards the left. 
Tal Cual, a tabloid founded in 2000 by leftist politician, former Cabinet member, one-time 
guerilla, and journalist Teodoro Petkoff may be “the most visually intriguing in the crowded 
Caracas scene.”  
 14. Molinski, supra note 2. 
 15. Carlos Lauria, Venezuelan Censorship Over Morgue Photo is Selective, COMM. TO 
PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Aug. 20, 2010, 4:10 PM), http://cpj.org/blog/2010/08/venezuelan-
censorship-over-morgue-photos-is-select.php. 
 16. Molinski, supra note 2; see also Rory Carroll, Venezuela Ban on Violent Images Fuels 
Censorship Row, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/18/venezuela-violent-images-censorship (running the 
word “Censored” in the place of photographs is a protest tactic used in Venezuela during its 
1950s dictatorship).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (Petkoff argued that the ban was a “clearly political” act “in the face of what he sees 
as the irresponsible conduct of the government with regard to the violence that is besetting 
Venezuela.” He further claimed “Tal Cual has never engaged in sensationalism on the subject of 
crime. “It was foreseeable,” according to Petkoff, that the Chávez administration would “kill the 
messenger” in the media rather than “pay attention to the message.”). 
    
2013] Balancing Regulation and Rights 275 
 
 
of the court’s ruling, maintaining that the ban constituted censorship 
blocking freedom of speech.19 For example, the National Journalists 
Association claimed, “[a] noble cause such as the protection of minors 
is being used as an excuse to silence the media.”20 
This article argues that the “media war” between the Chávez 
government and opposition voices, ongoing during Chávez’s fourteen 
years as President, is a double-edged sword. 21 While the Chávez 
government and its supporters consistently portrayed media regulations 
as necessary protections, privately owned opposition media and many 
international organizations condemned them as threats to freedoms of 
speech and information.22 An action such as the violent photo ban, 
which could be considered a battle in the media war, can be framed 
distinctively according to each conflicting viewpoint.23 In this media 
war, however, a clear “win” by either side would be detrimental to the 
public. Therefore, this Article proposes that a nuanced balancing 
approach best resolves the conflict between regulation and rights. 
Looking forward, this Article provides a theoretical framework for 
assessing  post-Chávez media regulation in Venezuela. 
Part II discusses the Chávez government’s position in support of 
media regulations, such as the violent photo ban. Avowed commitment 
to Bolivarian Socialism and condemnation of private media ownership 
by Chávez and his supporters underlie media restriction. Two main 
objectives provide further justification for media regulation. First, the 
Venezuelan legal framework consistently calls for the protection of 
children. Second, threats by political opposition to government and 
social stability necessitated preservation of national security.  The 
government and its supporters relied upon these objectives to 
 
 19. See, e.g., Molinski, supra note 2 (for example, news sources such as the B.B.C. and 
Wall Street Journal framed the ban as “censorship” while international organizations such as the 
Committee to Protect Journalists and the National Journalists issued statements condemning the 
ban). 
 20. Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 2 (The 
Association also expressed concern that the ban would “create self-censorship” in the affected 
media outlets.).  
 21. This article focuses on Chávez’s interactions with the private media from his election in 
1999 until the end of his third presidential term in October 2012. See Venezuela’s Media War, 
B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2827273.stm 
(introducing the concept of the "media war). Chávez was re-elected to another six-year 
presidential term in October 2012, but he passed away after an ongoing struggle with cancer on 
March 5, 2013. See Chávez Celebrates Re-election in Venezuela, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012) 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19867445; Iconic Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez Dies, B.B.C. NEWS, (Mar. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-21679053.  
 22. See, e.g., Chris Kraul, Hugo Chavez Targets Venezuelan Media, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/world/fg-venez-censor22. 
 23. Romero, supra note 2 (“The debate over the morgue photograph published by El 
Nacional is intensifying, evolving into a broader discussion over the government’s efforts to 
clamp down on the news outlets it does not control.”). 
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substantiate the violent photograph ban. 
Part III examines the role of media regulation in Venezuela from 
the perspective of Chávez’s opposition. According to the opposition 
position, restrictions upon the press threatened rights and unjustifiably 
exceeded the government’s role. Privately owned media sources and 
international organizations tended to support this position and demand 
limits on Chávez’s regulation of the media.  The opposition 
characterized measures against, and restrictions on, the press, such as 
the violent photograph ban, as dangerous threats to the freedoms of 
expression and information.  
Part IV analyzes the competing positions discussed in Parts II and 
III. Going forward, post-Chávez, Venezuela’s public interest must be 
the crucial consideration, as the nation is plagued by crime and 
economic difficulty. Contemporary international coverage of the media 
war and frameworks for analyzing the media fail to focus on the 
priorities of the people and of political pluralism. Emphasizing one 
extreme to the exclusion of the other in the media war endangers the 
public good. Therefore, analysis of the Venezuelan media war requires a 
balance between the two positions. Since the current frameworks fail to 
adequately account for both reasonable regulation and rights protection, 
this article proposes a novel theoretical model that balances each 
alongside the needs of the public. Applying the balancing approach to 
the violent photo ban displays this approach’s superiority.  
Finally, Part V concludes that the balancing approach should be 
used to address future media regulation in Venezuela and other nations. 
By taking into account the competing objectives in the media war and 
averting unfettered control by either side, this approach will best uphold 
the public good. 
II. REGULATING FOR THE PEOPLE:  
THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE 
During Chávez’s time in office, his administration and supporters 
consistently cited a number of objectives regarding creating and 
upholding media regulation.  An introduction to the aims of Chávez’s 
Bolivarian Socialism and the contrasting concentration of private media 
ownership illustrates the fundamental government concerns underlying 
the use of regulation. In presenting the Chávez administration’s 
perspective, this part focuses upon two further objectives of regulation: 
protecting children and preserving national security.24 The court issuing 
the violent photograph ban and the government’s defense cited these 
 
 24. Other possible objectives include disseminating cultural values, avoiding propaganda 
and hate speech, protecting public health, and moral concerns. See Angel Luis Olivera Soto, Prior 
Restraints in Venezuela’s Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act: Are They Justified?, 
40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 401, 402 (2008). 
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concerns, which recur in Venezuela’s legal framework.25 From the 
perspective of the Chávez regime, socialist and people-centered 
objectives justified restrictions such as the violent photo ban.   
A. Promotion of Bolivarian Socialism & Reduction  
of Private Media Ownership 
The historical development of Chávez’s strained relationship with 
the private media provides some initial insight into his actions. The 
Venezuelan government has long regulated the media, alternately 
creating and eliminating restrictions.26 While a few past presidents 
enjoyed friendlier relationships with the media,27 the “war” between 
Chávez and the media was neither directly attributable nor novel to the 
Chávez administration.28 The relationship between the administration 
and private media evolved throughout Chávez’s fourteen-year 
presidency.29 During election times and his presidency, Chávez relied 
upon both public and private media to develop and maintain support and 
identification with the people.30 Nevertheless, much of the privately-
 
 25. See Venezuelan Police Search Newspaper Office, supra note 7; Molinksi, supra note 2. 
 26. For example, the 1939 Communications Law heavily restricted broadcast licensing, 
creating a “virtual monopoly in the nation for those few broadcasters who were already lucky 
enough to be in the air,” while the 1940 Telecommunications Law mandated state control over all 
major communications matters. Jose Antonio Mayobre, Venezuela and the Media: The New 
Paradigm, LATIN POLITICS, GLOBAL MEDIA  
176, 183 (Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord, eds., 2002). Reductions in regulation and 
liberalization of the broadcasting industry during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s prompted 
minor increases in media pluralism; however, licenses were awarded mainly to political allies and 
party members. Id. at 179.  
 27. Although President Carlos Andrés Pérez (President from 1974-79 and 1989-93) 
occasionally conflicted with the media, “he knew how to play the game.” Id. at 181. Pérez had an 
especially strong relationship with the Cisernos brothers—one of his first formal visits as 
president was to the Venevision station, and he also fled to the station during a coup in 1990. Id. 
 28. During the 1960’s the Romulo Betancourt administration suspended constitutional 
provisions, shut down the media outlets of communist parties, and pursued policies limiting 
opposition media. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The Luis Herrera Campins (President from 
1979-84) administration often clashed with the media, and developed a new national 
communication policy that reduced the power of private media outlets. Following his presidency, 
at least one television network explicitly banned Herrera from its broadcasts. President Jaime 
Lusinchi (President from 1984-89) generally communicated with the media through his private 
secretary-mistress-eventual wife, a radio announcer. He publicly broke with the media by the end 
of his presidency. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 180.  
 29. See BARRY CANNON, HUGO CHÁVEZ AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION: POPULISM 
AND DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBALISED AGE, 129 (2009) (describing a progression in the 
relationship between Chávez and the media from balance, to hostility, to seditious rebellion. 
Although he had media support at the beginning, Chávez’s failure to continue providing 
advertising income and subsidies led the private media to become “a space for consensus-seeking 
amongst the opposition, and not between government and opposition as it had hitherto acted.”).  
 30.  El Nacional and broadcasters including the Cisneros family supported Chávez’s first 
campaign for president. GREGORY WILPERT, CHANGING VENEZUELA BY TAKING POWER: THE 
HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT 206 (2007). During his daily Alo 
Presidente show, Chávez regularly attended to individual complaints and requests for aid from 
citizens. Id. at 48. VENEZUELAN POLITICS IN THE CHÁVEZ ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION, AND 
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owned media became increasingly anti-Chávez in its coverage.31 Chávez 
supporters, on the other hand, claimed that the administration regulated 
appropriately in the face of serious new challenges by the opposition, 
and strived to improve the status of media for all people.32 
Chávez’s attempted transformation of Venezuelan politics and 
society further elucidated his relationship with the opposition and 
private media. Chávez continuously emphasized class and social 
concerns rather than simply pursuing conventional market-driven 
economic objectives.33 His avowed commitment to a new form of 
socialism, “Bolivarian Socialism,” motivated novel approaches to 
government regulation and goals.34 Furthermore, Chávez attempted to 
minimize privatization and business interests through the nationalization 
of major industries and community delegation, demonstrating his 
prioritization of the people.35 In pursuit of pluralism, the Chávez 
administration also encouraged and facilitated the establishment of 
grassroots groups and public communication outlets as mechanisms for 
direct popular participation.36 
Venezuela’s private media, on the other hand, remains one of the 
nation’s few major privatized and capital-concentrated industries.37 
 
CONFLICT (Steve Ellner & Daniel C. Hellinger eds., 2003). 
 31. Only in later elections did the media adopt anti-Chávez positions, publish incorrect poll 
results and provide greater space to opposition candidates. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 183. 
 32. See Interview by Juan Reardon with Edwin Chirinos Duque, a professor at 
the Bolivarian University of Venezuela in Merida, and a supporter of Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez, and interview with Maria Perez, member of Acción Democrática, or Democratic 
Action (AD), an anti-Chavez political party (June 30, 2011), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6314 (presenting a dialogue between two Venezuelan 
political activists). Duque stated “[t]he updating of technologies, the launching of numerous local, 
national, and regional radio, television, and internet-based medias has [sic] succeeded in breaking 
the hegemonic communicational barriers imposed by the global elite.” Id. 
 33. See STEVE ELLNER, RETHINKING VENEZUELA POLITICS: CLASS, CONFLICT, AND THE 
CHÁVEZ PHENOMENON 5 (2008). Since his last popular election, Chávez remained well-
supported, especially by lower classes. Id.  
 34. Id. at 118, 171. See also IAIN BRUCE, THE REAL VENEZUELA: MAKING SOCIALISM IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY (2008). (discussing the transition from democratic to socialist rhetoric, 
particularly after Chávez’s 2005 announcement that he was implementing twenty-first century 
socialism). For more insight into Chávez’s objectives and actions, see Blog de Hugo Chávez, 
CHÁVEZ.ORG.VE (last visited Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.Chávez.org.ve; CORREO DEL ORINOCO 
(English Edition), available at http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/english-edition/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2011) (government-controlled, pro-Chávez newspaper). 
 35. ELLNER, supra note 33, at 118. 
 36. See ELLNER, supra note 33, at 177-94 (discussing government promotion of popular 
participation through grassroots and state-facilitated groups like Bolivarian Circles). See also Eva 
Golinger, Documents Reveal Multimillion Dollar Funding to Journalists and Media in Venezuela, 
VENEZUELANALYSIS (July 15, 2010), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5495 (“Not only do 
media and journalists in Venezuela have a near-absolute freedom of expression, during the past 
decade, under the Chávez administration, hundreds of new media outlets, many community-
based, have been created in order to foster and expand citizens’ access to media. Community 
media was prohibited under prior governments, which only gave broadcasting access to 
corporations willing to pay big money to maintain information monopolies in the country.”). 
 37. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 206.  
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Influential businessmen, large corporations, and wealthy families own 
the majority of the industry and possess a substantial market share in 
Venezuelan media distribution.38 For example, the immense global 
corporation, Grupo Cisneros, owns not only Venevision, Venezuela’s 
leading television network, but also holds interests ranging from 
entertainment and telecommunications companies to Los Leones del 
Caracas, Venezuela’s championship baseball team.39  
From the perspective of the Chávez administration, the privately-
owned media, controlled by a few powerful and wealthy individuals, 
did not represent the citizenry’s rights and desires nor accurately report 
the news. Media owners, while utilizing their power to shape public 
perception and policy, are likely to serve personal property and 
privilege interests rather than the needs of the people.40 Eleazar Diaz 
Rangel, the editor-in-chief of Ultimas Noticias, Venezuela’s highest-
circulating newspaper, has stated, “What’s not published in Venezuela 
is what media owners don’t want published.”41 
Political polarization defined the divisions between the private 
media and Chávez. Due to the relative lack of interest and competing 
factions in greater Venezuelan society, private media may be the “only 
solid base of power of the old elite,” which is itself reliant upon racism 
 
 38. Private media possesses the greatest market share of Venezuela’s media distribution—
private ownership (including family, widely held, and employee-owned) of Venezuela’s top five 
daily newspapers is 100% and top five television stations is 75%. Simeon Djankov et. al, Who 
Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003) (analyzing the concentration of media ownership 
and “media freedom” based upon journalists jailed, media outlets closed, journalists jailed, and 
internet restrictions, measured alongside controls such as GDP, autocracy, political and economic 
freedom, and health outcomes). See also Mark Weisbrot and Tara Ruttenberg, Television in 
Venezuela: Who Dominates the Media?, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, (Dec. 
2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/2010_12_venezuela_media.pdf 
(finding market domination by private channels and estimating that over 94% of television 
viewed by Venezuelans is not pro-government). 
 39. CISNEROS GROUP, http://www.cisneros.com/Home (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). The 
Cisneros Group, which is owned and controlled by a Venezuelan family with longtime access to 
the Presidential Palace and a history of supporting democratic candidates, has now expanded its 
communications business to approximately forty countries and is headquartered in South Florida. 
Gerardo Reyes, Self-Censorship in Latin America, 11 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1 (2002). See Naomi 
Klein, Venezuela’s Media Coup, THE NATION (Feb. 13, 2003), 
http://www.naomiklein.org/articles/2003/02/venezuelas-media-coup. (“Venezuela’s private 
television stations are owned by wealthy families with serious financial stakes in defeating 
Chávez. Venevision, the most-watched network, is owned by Gustavo Cisneros, a mogul dubbed 
the ‘joint venture king’ by the New York Post. The Cisneros Group has partnered with many top 
US brands-from AOL and Coca-Cola to Pizza Hut and Playboy-becoming a gatekeeper to the 
Latin American market.”). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations, 
“What’s Not Published in Venezuela Is What Media Owners Don’t Want Published,” 
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Dec. 13, 2010), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5854media war (As 
one pro-Chávez sociologist stated, “What has developed is an anchor between citizens and media 
outlets that reinforce their existing political opinions . . . As such, the media has a dedicated 
audience that is politically and ideologically aligned but, on the whole, uninformed.”). 
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and classism.42 Moreover, many media leaders “promulgate a pro-U.S. 
[sic], market friendly, liberal democratic agenda” that tends to be more 
consistent with the aims of Chávez’s opposition than that of his 
Bolivarian Revolution.43 These incompatibilities resulted in a dynamic 
and increasingly combative relationship between Chávez and the private 
media.44  
Overall, from the Chávez administration’s perspective, the power 
and influence of Venezuela’s private media threatened the development 
of a new socialist society. Chávez’s reaction to the violent photograph 
reflected these concerns, as he declared “The country demands respect . 
. . The publication of this image just shows desperation, because they 
are trying to sabotage the Bolivarian Revolution by any means.”45 
B.  Protection of Children 
The court issuing the violent photograph ban presented 
psychological and moral protection of children as its chief 
justification.46 From the government’s perspective, the graphic nature of 
these particular photographs (naked bodies at a morgue), in conjunction 
with its casual exhibition (displayed on newsstands or by home 
delivery), posed irreparable harm to children.47 Likewise, the 
 
 42. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 205. As the formerly powerful elite loses campaigns and 
other bases of power, they are desperate for restoration of the status quo. Id. at 206. The old elite 
has used the media to gain middle class support by such methods as campaigns taking “advantage 
of the latent racism and classism in Venezuela culture.” Id. at 20. See also CANNON, supra note 
29, at 63 (2009) (discussing the private media’s employment of race- and class-based fears in 
mobilizing the middle and upper classes against proposed 2001 enabling laws); Ellner and 
Hellinger, supra note 30, at 20 (discussing both racism of the opposition and Chávez’s 
disproportionately effective communication towards poor and uneducated classes). 
 43. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 126. 
 44. See Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32. Pro-Chávez voice Duque declares “a pool 
of television channels and radio stations, in addition to their internet-based allies, go about 
shamelessly lying, experimenting with all of the ideological venoms produced in U.S. and 
European labs.” Id. “Their objective is to keep their follows following, founded in a submissive 
mindset, individual chains which are stronger than real, physical chains. If one takes a look at the 
programming on Venezuelan television, a majority of shows are based on fascist, right wing 
content that advances their political interests.” Id. “Everything these media elite produce is 
created in the image of their economic interests, including their disgraceful attempts to coerce 
leaders and secure electoral victories against parties and leaders they disagree with.” Id. “The 
corporate media is a supranational entity that uses threats and manipulation to guarantee its 
interests are defended, overriding many of the most fundamental national judicial mechanisms.” 
Id. 
 45. See Golinger, supra note 36 (“Today, corporate media outlets and their journalists use 
communications power to publicly promote the overthrow of the Venezuelan government. The 
owners and executives of these media corporations form part of the Venezuelan elite that, under 
the reigns of Washington, ran the country for forty years before Chávez won the presidency in 
1998.”). 
 46. See Molinski, supra note 2.  
 47. “Imagine you’re walking on the street with your children and you pass a newsstand with 
today’s papers displayed as usual and the front pages clearly visible to all who pass by. But to 
your horror, today’s national daily has an almost full-page graphic image of dead, bloodied 
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Venezuelan legal framework emphasizes the protection of children as 
an important public concern. The Chávez administration often 
employed this concern in creating and defending regulation. 
The most significant foundation of Venezuela’s media regulatory 
structure, the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television 
(“Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión,” hereinafter 
RESORTE), uses child protection as a purpose and guide in establishing 
its broadcasting requirements.48  While this law does not expressly 
target newspapers such as those that published the violent photograph, it 
demonstrates the fundamental moral justification relied upon by the 
Chávez government. The law’s fundamental purposes include 
“protection of the children and adolescents” and “integral education of 
the children.”49 Likewise, the government maintained that RESORTE 
was needed for “the development of children and adolescents who 
constitute the group of society most susceptible to influence.”50   
RESORTE mandates strict requirements for children’s 
programming. For example, television and radio messages must qualify 
as “directed at children” for at least eighteen hours per day.51 RESORTE 
presented the government with one major means by which to protect 
children, while also demonstrating the perceived importance of this 
objective. 
Further pronouncements regarding children’s rights encouraged 
the use of government regulation to protect children. Venezuela’s 
Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents (LOPNA) 
guarantees children and adolescents certain rights and protections from 
the State, society, and families.52 LOPNA places affirmative duties upon 
media outlets and the government alongside negative restrictions upon 
potentially harmful material when creating and broadcasting children’s 
programming.53  Additionally, Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution 
articulates a national commitment to child protection, education, and 
 
bodies piled on top of each other in the local morgue. Every newsstand you walk by has the same 
image, even repeated in several national and local papers. Your children are forced to see this 
with no warning.” Golinger, supra note 36.  
 48. See Soto, supra note 24, at 465. The Venezuelan law for broadcast media, RESORTE, 
was enacted in December 2004. Id. RESORTE regulates all aspects of Venezuelan radio and 
television programming, production, and viewership. Id. See also LEY RESORTE, 
http://www.leyresorte.gob.ve/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). 
 49. Id. at 442. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 431–35. All television channels are required to show child-friendly programming 
at certain specified times under “all users” and “supervised” blocks, along with developing child-
specific programs. Id. These provisions are strictly enforced. Id. 
 52. Ley Orgánica para la Protección del Niño y del Adolescente, La Gaceta Oficial N° 5.266 
(Oct. 2, 1998) (Venez.) hereinafter LOPNA, available at 
http://www.ventanalegal.com/leyes/ley_organica_proteccion_nino_adolescente.htm (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010). 
 53. See, e.g., LOPNA arts. 70–73 (providing for affirmative obligations); Id. art. 75 
(prohibiting information and/or images that “promote or incite violence”). 
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development.54 Regarding media, Article 58 reads “[c]hildren and 
adolescents have the right to receive adequate information for purposes 
of their overall development.”55 In addition, international laws 
specifically expound upon the children-centered aspirations of the 
domestic framework.56 
Venezuelan courts have also used the protection of children as a 
basis for making certain media-related decisions. For example, in 
February 2007, a child welfare court57 fined Tal Cual author Laureano 
Marquez and editor Teodoro Petkoff a total of almost $50,000 for 
addressing a satirical editorial letter to President Chávez’s daughter.58 
The letter first appeared on the front page of the opposition newspaper 
in November 2005.59 It asked Chávez’s nine-year old daughter Rosinés 
to request that her father “soften his attacks on his political 
opponents.”60 The government prosecuted the newspaper on the child’s 
behalf.61  
Citing LOPNA and the UNCRC, the court asserted several 
 
 54. The newest Constitution of Venezuela [Constitución de la República Bolivariana de 
Venezuela] [hereinafter Constitution] was adopted on December 20, 1999. See Constitución de la 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela, available at http://venezuelanalysis.com/constitution. The 
1999 Constitution was the result of a long process: a popular referendum to ask the people if they 
wanted a new Constitution, the calling of a Constitutional Assembly, and approval as a final 
referendum by popular vote. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The country was renamed the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at this point, signifying Chávez’s new objectives. Id. Examples 
of child-centered language include Title III, Chapter V, entitled “Social and Family Rights,” 
which discusses familial rights and responsibilities. Article 78 provides for legal rights and 
recourse: “Children and adolescents are full legal persons and shall be protected . . . The State 
shall promote their progressive incorporation into active citizenship, and shall create a national 
guidance system for the overall protection of children and adolescents.” Constitution art. 78. 
 55. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 58.  
 56. For example, Venezuela became a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990. CRC’s Article 17 addresses mass media, delineating State 
obligations such as encouraging “the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of 
the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being.” Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25, art. 17(e) (Sept. 2, 1990), 
[hereinafter CRC] available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (“State Parties 
recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that the child has 
access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, 
especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, spiritual and moral well-being and 
physical and mental health.”). Additionally, Article 13 provides that children “shall have the right 
to freedom of expression.” CRC art. 13. 
 57. In Spanish, the court, which is specifically intended for cases involving children and 
adolescents, is called the “Tribunal de Protección del Niño y Adolescente de la Circunscripción 
Judicial del Estaso Lara.” A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities 
for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 91 (2008), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/18/decade-under-ch-vez. The 1999 Constitution 
established the court with the premise that a separate court would best protect children’s rights 
and development. Id. 
 58. Id. at 90 (citing Case No. KP02-V-2006-00226). Tal Cual is one of the newspapers that 
published the violent photograph. See supra note 13. 
 59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 90. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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rationales related to child protection, including the child’s honor and 
reputation, privacy, family life, and social development.62 The judge 
found in particular that the column had “seriously compromised” the 
rights established by Article 65 of LOPNA.63 The judge also reasoned 
that the letter harmed the father-child relationship because the satirical 
letter “incited disrespect for symbols of the nation and for her father, 
since, regardless of the office he holds, he deserves his children’s 
respect, and a medium of communication should not encourage a young 
girl to despise her father, or involve a girl in political argument 
concerning the post that he holds, nor does the girl need to have direct 
knowledge of the political objections of the citizens . . . .”64   
Overall, the child-centered nature of the Venezuelan legal 
framework demonstrates an avowed commitment to protecting, 
educating, and positively influencing the development of children. In 
this way, the Chávez government justified media regulation as 
necessary to protect the rights of a particularly vulnerable segment of 
society by preventing the dissemination of potentially destructive 
information.  
C. Preservation of National Security  
Chávez supporters characterized El Nacional and Tal Cual’s 
publication of the violent photograph as just one opposition attack in an 
ongoing “media war” against the Chávez government and its citizenry.65 
In Chávez’s view, the private media’s powerful influence during 
Venezuela’s recent history of political and social unrest required 
restrictions.66 In particular, media played an essential role throughout 
the tumultuous coup d’état in 2002, in which Chávez was removed from 
 
 62. Id. at 91. 
 63. Id at 91–92. See LOPNA, supra 52, art. 65. Protects children’s “right to honor, 
reputation, self-image, private life, and family privacy, which may not be subject to arbitrary and 
illegal interference.” The Article prohibits the publication of information that could affect a 
child’s honor or privacy, especially those who are victims or perpetrators of crime. Id. The 
judge’s rationale, however, was partially based on common sense: “there is no report to determine 
how her rights were damaged, what were the disturbances in her family life, what was the harm 
caused, but we know that it is so, since we have all been children. . . .” Id. 
 64. Id. at 91. “The judge concluded that the child’s rights to honor, peer-group relations, 
family life, and social development had been gravely affected.” Id. at 92. Two days after the 
article’s publication Chávez had discussed his daughter’s reaction to the article on his Aló 
Presidente radio show, saying “She said to me: ‘Papi, it’s a lack of respect for the coat-of-arms.’ 
She didn’t complain about herself, but about the coat-of-arms, you see? How fantastic children 
are! How fantastic children are to teach a lesson to those animals infesting the sewers!” Id. In 
deciding the case two years later, the child welfare judge referenced this reaction, stating “it is 
also evident, and follows from the [president’s] speeches on ‘Hello President’ that neither the 
father, nor the child herself, agrees with the publication.” Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 65. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 2 (“The government says the photograph was meant to 
undermine it, not to inform the public.”).  
 66. See supra note 30 (discussing the private media’s turn against Chávez).  
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office for forty-seven hours.67 Privately owned, opposition-supporting 
media outlets provided constant publicity in support of an opposition-
organized march demanding Chávez’s resignation.68 Chávez, detained 
by the opposition, agreed to step down temporarily from the presidency, 
but refused to resign.69 The media, however, led the public to believe 
that he had indeed resigned.70 When Chávez returned to power two days 
later, privately owned television stations omitted the news, instead 
airing the film Pretty Woman and Tom and Jerry cartoons.71  
Following the 2002 coup, the war between Chávez and the media 
continued. For example, several privately owned media outlets 
supported a general strike shutting down Venezuela’s oil industry in 
protest of the Chávez government.72 During the sixty-seven-day long 
strike, these stations broadcasted approximately 700 pro-strike, anti-
Chávez advertisements per day.73   
Media-promoted unrest threatened not only the Chávez 
administration’s stability, but also social stability.74 Both publicly and 
privately owned outlets were targeted by violence related to the media 
war.75 Even when attacks targeted opposition media, the government 
strived to preserve the peace and condemn such actions.76 Furthermore, 
 
 67. See Klein, supra note 39. 
 68. El Nacional and Tal Cual, the newspapers that published the violent photo, were two of 
the predominant print media sources providing highly partisan coverage in the time surrounding 
the 2002 media coup. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 69. “[I]n the days leading up to 
the April coup, Venevision, RCTV, Globovision and Televen replaced regular programming with 
relentless anti-Chávez speeches, interrupted only for commercials calling on viewers to take to 
the streets: ‘Not one step backwards. Out! Leave Now!’ The ads were sponsored by the oil 
industry, but the stations carried them free, as ‘public service announcements.’” Klein, supra note 
39. 
 69. A counter-march in support of president/clash between two sides occurred also. Soto, 
supra note 24, at 407. Chávez finally stepped down at the urging of high forces. 
 70. Klein, supra note 39. A transitional government was put in place, led by Pedro Carmona 
as interim President, but a counter-coup by the pro-Chávez Presidential Guard returned Chávez to 
power within the next two days. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. The oil industry, which has been struggling in recent years, is the foundation of 
Venezuela’s economy. See Romero, supra note 2. Lost economic activity during this particular 
strike, which lasted for sixty-four days, cost the country approximately $14 billion. Bernardo 
Alvarez Herrera, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States, Political Conflict and Freedom of 
Expression in Venezuela, ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L., 565, 567 (2005). 
 73. Id. See Klein, supra note 39. 
 74. Herrera, supra note 72, at 567.  
 75. For example, drive-by shooters injured two workers at the regional branch of ViveTV, a 
state-owned, community-based television channel. Tamara Pearson, Shooting Attack on 
Venezuelan Community Television Station ViveTV, VENEZUELANALYSIS (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6395 (“Vive’s programming consists of cultural and education 
shows. 90% of Vive’s content is created outside the studio, unlike the other state owned station, 
VTV, which is highly studio based. Vive is known for its grassroots, community-based & created 
coverage. It has also organized tens of thousands of media production workshops around 
country.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Rory Carroll, Venezuelan TV Station is Stormed by Supporters of Hugo 
Chávez, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2009), available at 
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the violent effects of the media war often reached the general 
population. Throughout the 2002 coup, murders, injuries, and looting 
endangered public safety.77 As the Chávez administration struggled with 
societal crime, violent and disturbing imagery in the press challenged 
stability instead of promoting it.78 
From the perspective of the Chávez administration, selectivity and 
misinformation in the private media further challenged public 
confidence in the government. Privately owned media sources accused 
Chávez of implausible dealings ranging from commanding slum militias 
to causing a major mudslide.79 They also misreported information such 
as the results of public opinion polls and omitted important events such 
as the launching of the first Venezuelan satellite, named the Simon 
Bolivar.80 Such selective releases of information and deliberate 
misinformation provoked future unrest against the government and 
provided the rationale for the need to restrain the media. 
As with the protection of children, the 1999 Constitution 
consistently calls for the preservation of national security.81 For 
example, Article 322 maintains, “[n]ational security is an essential 
competence and responsibility of the State, based on the overall 
development of the latter, and its defense is the responsibility of all 
Venezuelans.”82 Societal responsibility for preserving order should be 
shared by public and private entities.83  Similarly, RESORTE repeatedly 
 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/04/venezuela-tv-station-armed-raid (Individual 
supporters of Chávez stormed the Globovision office, armed with tear gas and handguns. Interior 
minister, Tareck El Aissami, asserted that the attacks were not the result of government influence: 
“We condemn this attack energetically and reject this type of violent action against Globovision. 
We don’t accept that violence is the instrument to solve our differences.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Reggae Artist Defies Ban on Violent Images, FREEMUSE (Aug. 24, 2010), 
http://www.freemuse.org/sw38948.asp. The music video “Rotten Town” was released just after 
the violent photo ban was issued, when it still applied to all violent images. Id. The video, by 
Venezuelan reggae singer Onechot, portrays an innocent child struck down by a stray bullet and 
his blood seeping through Caracas’ streets. The video has spread rapidly across the Internet 
despite government protests. Id. 
 79. Opposition in the media has accused Chávez of “plotting assassinations and bombings, 
sponsoring foreign terrorist organizations and leading anti-democratic movements across the 
hemisphere, and commanding an army of clandestine guerilla groups and slum militias.” Soto, 
supra note 24. Commentaries and editorials “appeared to blame Chávez for just about every 
problem in Venezuela, from the Vargas mudslide to the coup.” WILPERT, supra note 30, at 205. 
 80. Id. at 24 (regarding inaccurate reporting of public opinion polls); Map of Freedom in the 
World: Venezuela, FREEDOM HOUSE (2009), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7733 (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010) (regarding media’s failure to report on satellite launch). 
 81. In fact, the seventh of its nine sections is entitled “National Security.” See Constitution, 
supra note 54, art. 322–32. 
 82. Id. art. 322. 
 83. “National security is based on shared responsibility between the State and civil society 
to implement the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, freedom, justice, 
solidarity, promotion and conservation of the environment and affirmation of human rights. . . . 
The principle of shared responsibility applies to the economic, social, political, cultural, 
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asserts national security objectives, declaring that “content 
dissemination is governed by the public interest by virtue of its 
importance and impact on social, cultural, political, economic and 
national security.”84 These references to national security provide 
authority and an ideological ground for security-based media 
restrictions. 
According to the Chávez administration and its supporters, this 
history of threats by Venezuela’s privately owned media towards the 
government, and against social stability, validated the use of 
regulations. Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, Bernardo 
Alvarez Herrera, framed the government’s stability concern: “What is 
the proper role of the state when it is faced with a media whose power is 
roughly equal to that of that state, and when that power is used actively 
to destabilize a democratically elected government?”85 Discussing the 
violent photograph ban, Chávez stressed the potentially destabilizing 
nature of the battle, stating, “[t]he opposition have been working on a 
mix of plans, so that by today we would have been in a state of chaos in 
the country . . . Nonetheless, it seems as though their plans haven’t 
worked and they are desperate now, so they are trying to generate 
reactions from the people.”86 
In sum, the Chávez government justified media regulations with its 
objectives of promoting Bolivarian socialism, protecting children, and 
preserving national security. In light of the needs of the Venezuelan 
people, goals of the government, and the national legal framework, such 
regulations may be necessary. According to the government 
perspective, reasonable regulations like the violent photograph ban 
benefited the people and advanced the aims of the Bolivarian 
Revolution. 
III. ENDANGERING RIGHTS: THE OPPOSITION ARGUMENT  
AGAINST MEDIA REGULATION 
Critics of the violent photograph ban characterized it as an 
 
geographical, environmental and military spheres.” Constitution, supra note 54, art. 326.  
 84. LEY RESORTE, supra note 48, art. 3. The government is responsible for “[t]he protection 
of national security.” RESORTE art. 6(2). 
 85. Herrara, supra note 72, at 565–66 (Herrara’s speech to the International Law Student’s 
Association advanced the government’s view on political conflict and freedom of expression in 
Venezuela, advocating that freedom of expression and the press are thriving in the nation.). See 
also Soto, supra note 24, at 456 (“It is a vital interest of the state to protect its political stability 
and prevent potential plots to overthrow its democratically elected government, and the political 
unrest in Venezuela, combined with the antagonistic role the media has played in it” can justify 
reasonable restrictions. The restrictions on freedom of expression imposed by RESORTE are 
justified based on the security of the nation.). 
 86. Eva Golinger, Media Pornography, VENEZUELANALYSIS, (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5581. 
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infringement upon rights of the people and press.87 While the Chávez 
government emphasized the need for regulations like the ban, 
opposition voices in privately owned media sources and supportive 
international organizations portrayed such measures as unwarranted 
risks to rights exceeding the government’s authority.88 According to this 
position in the media war, measures silencing opposition in the media 
threatened freedoms of expression and information. 
A.  Measures Against the Press 
The opposition cited government action against and influence over 
the press as a threat to rights. According to the opposition, the Chávez 
administration unreasonably targeted privately owned media with 
extreme regulation and punishment. Chávez’s stated concerns about 
media ownership conflicted with growing government control over both 
public and private media.  
The opposition suggested that targeted attacks against the media 
such as imprisonment, sanctions, and shutdown of news sources unduly 
silenced any challenges to Chávez.89 From this perspective, these attacks 
promoted self-censorship in all privately owned media, damaged the 
well-being and business of targeted individuals and entities, and 
threatened individual rights.90  
The government punished many individual members of the 
media.91 For instance, Oswaldo Álvarez Paz, an opposition leader and 
former state governor who writes columns for El Nacional, was jailed 
and prosecuted in February 2010 for publicly claiming that Chávez 
 
 87. See Venuzela's Media War, supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
 88. One strong representation of the “opposition” is the Democratic Unity Table (MUD), the 
political coalition formed in preparation of the 2012 Presidential election, and the party of two-
time Presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski. See UNIDAD VENEZUELA, 
http://www.unidadvenezuela.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). See also ALLAN R. BREWER-
CARIAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN 
EXPERIMENT (2010) (Chávez opponent argues that the undemocratically enacted 1999 
Constitution has led to the dismantling of Venezuelan democracy.).  
 89. See, e.g., Journalist Committee Denounces Repressive Measures by Chávez, SOUTHERN 
PULSE (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http:www.southernpulse.com/_webapp_3834678?Journalist_committee_denounces_repressive_m
easures_by_Chávez (citing a report by the Venezuelan Journalists Protection Committee 
criticizing overly “aggressive” government regulations); WILPERT, supra note 30, at 33 (claiming 
that while the Chávez government did explicitly censor as feared by the opposition, the 
opposition protests intimidation of the private mass media occurring through methods such as 
fines and broadcast licensing). 
 90. See Soto, supra note 24. 
 91. See, e.g., Ender Ramírez Padrino, CNP Repudia Ataques Contra Periodistas y Medios 
de Comunicación, EL NACIONAL, (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://www.el-
nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/226286/Nación/CNP-repudia-ataques-contra-
periodistas-y-medios-de-comunicación. (National Committee to Protect Journalists complains of 
government silencing of journalists and lack of access to information, specifically repudiating 
attacks on LIVE TV host Zulia Fe y Alegria.). 
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supports Basque and Colombian terrorists.92 Similarly, columnist 
Francisco Perez was jailed in June 2010 after accusing a local mayor of 
nepotism in a newspaper editorial.93 A federal court sentenced Perez, 
who had forty years of journalism experience,  to three years and nine 
months in prison and fined over $18,000 (USD).94 The court relied on 
insult laws, questioned by the opposition, which provide for penalties 
including imprisonment, fines, disclosure of private information,95 and 
the denial of licenses.96 The court specifically relied upon an insult law 
prohibiting “disrespectful expression toward government officials.”97  
The Perez case represented a trend of punishing media members 
with severe penalties defined by wide judicial discretion but strong 
administrative influence.98 Such decisions appeared problematic because 
they promoted fear of punishment while incentivizing selective self-
censorship.  
From the opposition perspective,  the shutdown of privately owned 
television channels also indicated government impropriety. Following 
the 2002 media coup, Chávez identified four major opposition channels 
as the “four horsemen,” blaming them largely for the coup’s success.99 
These channels became government targets. In 2007, the government 
shut down RCTV Internacional, the most popular television channel in 
 
 92. See Roger Noriega, The Jailing of Oswaldo Álvarez Paz, FORBES, (Mar. 23, 
2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/23/hugo-chavez-venezuela-oswaldo-alvarez-paz-
opinions-contributors-roger-noriega.html. Paz also acknowledged the existence of drug 
trafficking in Venezuela. Id. He was charged with conspiracy, “public instigation of criminality” 
and “spreading false information.” Id. 
 93. See Roy Greenslade, IFJ Condemns Jail Sentence on Venezuelan Columnist, GUARDIAN 
(June 18, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2010/jun/18/press-freedom-
venezuela. 
 94.  Id. The International Federation of Journalists maintained, “it is a brutal, unacceptable 
judgment with very few international precedents.” Id. 
 95. For example, in July 2005, the Office of the Attorney General used insult laws to justify 
the investigation of major newspaper El Universal for an article that was critical of Chávez and 
the judiciary. In November of the same year, an El Nacional writer was forced to hand over a tape 
of interviews, with the government’s justification being that he had made them near the 
presidential palace. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press: Venezuela (2009), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7088&year=2009. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Freedom of the Press: Venezuela (2009), FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7088&year=2009 (“In August, 
the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) closed two FM radio stations for 
operating without proper licenses. The closures were condemned in Venezuela and abroad as 
politically motivated.”). 
 97. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57 at 65 (these laws were reformed in 2005 to 
increase penalties for criminal defamation and libel). 
 98. See, e.g., Soto, supra note 24 (citing the deprival of freedom of expression rights by 
some courts, often combined with the use of broad judicial discretion and a lack of strong 
justification); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57 (discussing several court cases in which 
harsh penalties were issued for journalists and referencing the vagueness of provisions as one 
explanation for unduly harsh outcomes).  
 99. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57. The four horsemen were the channels 
RCTV Internacional, Globovision, Venevision and Televen. Id. 
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Venezuela, by denying renewal of its public license and forcing it to 
move to subscriber cable.100 In early 2010, the Chávez administration 
further ordered cable networks to stop broadcasting the channel, saying 
it would lift the suspension only if RCTV agreed to comply with  its 
demands, for example, by agreeing to broadcast Chávez’s speeches.101 
In June 2012, Guillermo Zuloaga, an owner of the television news 
channel Globovision, fled the country after the government issued a 
warrant for his arrest.102  
The Chávez government also doled out penalties that the 
opposition considered extreme. For example, in October 2011, the 
National Commission on Telecommunications (CONATEL) fined 
Globovision $2.16 million USD for its coverage of a prison riot.103 
 
 100. This was a highly unpopular decision condemned domestically and internationally. 
WILPERT, supra note 30, at 232. See also Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32, at 232 (“In 
Venezuela Freedom of Speech is of vital importance and it’s no secret to anyone that the closure 
of our oldest running television channel, RCTV, had a huge impact on Venezuelan society. After 
RCTV was closed, a large number of young people and other members of civil society raised 
their voice, and continue to do so, on behalf of freedom of expression. From that moment on 
people began to understand the importance of keeping themselves informed. Meanwhile, the 
government has gone on to close numerous other means of communication, including 
approximately 362 radio broadcasts and many other written media, though they maintain the 
independent media outlets that they consider too dangerous to close because of the enormous 
social backing and support they have – Globovision, for example.”). The government’s 
perspective on the shutdown was that RCTV’s participation in the 2002 coup, oil industry 
shutdown, and other regulatory violations, combined with the government’s discretionary power 
over licensing, legally permitted and in fact obligated the closure. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 
232. 
 101. See Anthony Mills, Venezuelan Student Killed in TV Protests, INT’L. PRESS INST. (Jan. 
26, 2010), http://www.freemedia.at/site-services/singleview-master/4682/. 
 102. See Venezuela Orders Arrest of TV Owner Critical of Chávez, B.B.C. NEWS (June 12, 
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10300428; T.V. Channel Owner Arrested in Venezuela, U.S.A. 
TODAY (June 12, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2012-06-venezuela-tv-
channel_N.htm. The state prosecutor claimed that the warrants were related to business issues 
with two car dealerships partially owned by the Zuloagas. Id. The opposition considered 
Globovision to be its main channel, even though it could only be watched by people with cable or 
an open signal source. Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32. In March 2013, Globovision 
announced that it had accepted a buyout offer, blaming its financial difficulties upon regulations 
by the Chávez government. Tamara Pearson, Venezuelan Opposition Channel Globovision to be 
Sold after Elections, VENEZUELANALYSIS, (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/8201. 
 103. See AVN, Comisión de Medios de la AN avala decisión de Conatel de multar a 
Globovisión, EL NACIONAL (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.el-
nacional.com/noticia/5628/16/Comisión-de-Medios-de-la-AN-avala-decisión-de-Conatel-de-
multar-a-Globovisión.htmlón-de-Medios-de-la-AN-avala-decisión-de-Conatel-de-multar-a-
Globovisión.html; Juan Francisco Alonso, Globovisión Accuses Government at International 
Courts, EL UNIVERSAL (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/111020/globovision-accuses-government-at-international-courts (discussing 
Globovision’s decision to appeal the fine to domestic and international courts); Tamara Pearson, 
Venezuelan Opposition TV Globovision Fined for Manipulation, VENEZUELANALYSIS, (Oct. 19, 
2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6569. A gang at Venezuela’s El Rodeo Prison took 
other prisoners hostage in June 2011. Id. CONATEL claimed that the station had created a 
“situation of uncertainty and anxiety” by encouraging families to protest outside of the prison, 
retransmitting the same interviews 269 times over four days, and showing footage of the 
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Opposition coalition MUD called the fine a “disguised attempt to close 
the channel,” while Venezuelan NGO Alianza por la Libertad de 
Expresión (Alliance for Freedom of Expression) characterized the 
penalty as “arbitrary” and “disproportionate.”104 Such attacks appeared 
to be targeted against political opposition, and more specifically the four 
horsemen. 
The Chávez government argued that the publication of incendiary 
pieces such as El Nacional’s violent photo fostered social instability, 
but the pattern of violence challenged this proposition.105 Although 
violence occurred against the media at large, this violence largely 
targeted the privately owned opposition media.106 For example, in 2008 
several opposition media members were subject to brutal attacks, 
including a reporter, a photographer,107 the vice president of a daily 
newspaper,108 and a news anchor.109 At times, Chávez called for such 
attacks in the media, and indeed government officials executed some of 
the attacks.110 Citizen protests against government restrictions also led to 
violence. In January 2010, a student was killed and nine police officers 
injured during protests against the government order to stop 
broadcasting RCTV International.111  The imbalance of violence against 
opposition media suggests that the Chávez media regulations may have 
served a political role exceeding the government’s authority.  
The opposition feared that the Chávez administration limited the 
media in order to preserve its own political power rather than to protect 
Venezuela’s citizenry. It blamed polarization in the press on 
government control over the media and the selective use of sanctions 
 
prisoner’s mothers. Id. CONATEL cited RESORTE Articles 27 and 29, which respectively 
provide for a fine of up to 10% of income and/or the suspension of transmissions for “promoting 
anxiety, disorder, or justifying crime.” Id. The penalty equaled about 7.5% of the station’s 2010 
gross income. Id. 
 104. Id. See El Universal, Alliance for Freedom of Expression Rejects Fine on TV Channel, 
EL UNIVERSAL (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/111020/alliance-for-freedom-of-expression-rejects-fine-on-tv-channel.  
 105. See supra Part II(B) (discussing threats to social stability).  
 106. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96 (“Violent attacks against the media such as 
shootings and assaults occur regularly.”). 
 107. In July 2008, a reporter and photographer from opposition newspaper La Verdad were 
assaulted by local officials while attempting to cover waste disposal practices. Id. The official 
confiscated the journalists’ equipment and they were allegedly beaten and held for over two 
hours. Id. 
 108. The vice president of the Caracas daily Reporte Diario de la Economia, Pierre Fould 
Gerges, was murdered in Caracas on June 2, 2008. Id. 
 109. Two weeks after Gerges’ murder, news anchor, Javier Garcia, of the opposition channel 
RCTV was found stabbed to death in his apartment. Id. Supposedly he had been robbed, but the 
case was still being investigated at the end of 2008. Id. 
 110. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 72 (arguing that such attacks upon 
individuals and social stability are generally not the fault of the journalists but instead 
governmental actions). 
 111. See Mills, supra note 101. 
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against opposition-supporting media.112 The government already 
exercised strong influence over the public, not only through media-
related policy, but also through publicly owned media sources.113  
If this was a media war, not all of the media was the enemy—the 
government chose which parts were.  As of 2009, government-
controlled publications included a daily newspaper, a number of 
television channels with national coverage, and Chávez’s daily radio 
and television program (Aló Presidente), broadcasted on the Radio 
Nacional network.114 The government further exercised control over 
commercial broadcasting in a variety of ways.115 Most notable among 
Chávez’s presidential powers over public access was the mandatory 
broadcasting of cadenas, official announcements replacing scheduled 
programming on all television channels.116 Overall, the government’s 
media influence and selective sanctioning suggested the need for strong 
counteracting voices. 
Past use of media and policy buttressed the premise that Chávez 
might attempt to defeat his political opposition through media control. 
As he came to power and throughout his presidency, Chávez took 
advantage of the media by gaining and retaining publicity in broadcasts 
and articles using publicly owned media outlets.117 For example, in the 
child welfare court case discussed in Part II, Tal Cual’s editor, Petkoff, 
argued that Chávez himself was responsible for making his daughter 
 
 112. Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32 (“The polarization of the means of 
communication was inevitable; with a great majority of media now controlled by the government, 
and with only a few independent channels that must watch what they say for fear of government 
reprisal, fines, and possible closure of their media outlet.” The opposition viewpoint in this 
dialogue also compares the large number of government-owned and controlled television 
networks to the lack of opposition-owned and controlled channels.).  
 113. Along with media control, “Mr. Chávez and his allies still control every significant 
federal institution in the country, including the Supreme Court, the national oil company, the 
attorney general’s office and the human rights ombudsman’s office. The bureaucracy has also 
been expanding through dozens of new expropriations and nationalizations of private 
corporations.” Romero, Shift in Venezuelan Politics as Chavez's Opposition Reclaims Seats in the 
Legislature, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/americas/28venez.html?_r=0. 
 114. See also Djankov, supra note 38, at 353 (finding that countries with greater state 
ownership of the media have less press, political, and economic freedom). 
 115. Before broadcasting, television programs and network chains must link to a central 
program. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 183. Commercial television stations are forced to buy 
packages including Channel 5, which features educational and documentary programming. Id. 
 116. During the first nine years of his presidency, Chávez ordered 1,710 mandatory 
broadcasts of his speeches and other government events, for a total of 43 days of uninterrupted 
transmission, often during peak viewing hours. During two months of the 2002-03 oil strike, 
President Chávez used 40 hours of airtime in addition to his weekly television and radio program. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 70.  
 117. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13, at 13. “The broadcast media helped to create 
Chávez.” Id. Chávez appeared on television during failed 1992 coup that first brought him in the 
public eye. Id. Before his election in 1998, he participated in televised interviews and debates. Id. 
It has been suggested that the print media, including papers like El Nacional and Tal Cual, has 
often been created more opposition to Chávez than the televised media. Id.  
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into a public figure in his speeches.118 Additionally, Chávez created a 
2009 reform abolishing term limits for the presidency and other elected 
offices to reinforce and extend his political power.119 These actions 
showed a willingness to use both media and regulation for pure political 
gains.120 
Opponents to Chávez media regulation asserted that the 
government dangerously restrained the media through the use of law 
and judicial enforcement.121 Obligations under laws such as RESORTE 
restrained what the media could broadcast and publish, with stations 
facing suspension and revocation of licenses for broadcasting material 
deemed inappropriate.122 Through specific registration and licensing 
requirements, the government selected whom, and under what 
conditions, could publish or broadcast.123 Failure to comply with 
requirements could lead to shutdown by the CONATEL.124 As of 
August 2009, thirty-four radio stations had recently had their licenses 
revoked, allegedly for “irregular paperwork.”125 The government 
targeted over two hundred additional radio stations for other alleged 
irregularities.126 The high number of stations facing difficulties 
involving government regulators demonstrated that government 
sanctioning may have been inappropriate and arbitrary, buttressing the 
 
 118. A few days before the article was published, during his weekly Aló Presidente radio 
broadcast, Chávez asked that the national coat of arms be modified since his daughter had noticed 
that the white horse on the emblem was looking the wrong way. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra 
note 57, at 92.  
 119. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96.  
 120. Id. (“Venezuela’s leading newspapers are privately owned, and most identify with the 
opposition. As a result, they are subject to threats and violence by the government and its 
supporters, sometimes leading to self-censorship. Local and regional media are particularly 
dependent on government advertising revenue, leaving them vulnerable to economic retaliation 
for criticism.”). 
 121. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 406 (citing the lack of process in administrative 
proceedings, use of sanctions, high-level decision making, and interruption of programming). 
Chief dangerous restraints in the law and targeted attacks against the media during the first 
decade of media regulation under Chávez include: an expansion of the scope of insult laws, 
increased penalties for defamation, libel, and vaguely defined incitement provisions, restrictions 
upon public access to information, and favoring government-owned over privately-owned 
television channels. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 90–91. 
 122. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 406. 
 123. One pre-Chávez journalism law, passed in 1994, created strict licensure requirements for 
journalism. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The law established harsh penalties, including 
imprisonment, for practicing without a license. Id.  
 124. CONATEL, formerly known as the Ministry of Communication, is Venezuela’s 
independent telecommunications regulator. Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones: Conatel 
Venezuela, BUSINESS NEWS AMERICAS, http://www.bnamericas.com/company-
profile/en/Comision_Nacional_de_Telecomunicaciones-Conatel_Venezuela (last visited Nov. 29, 
2010). The agency is intended to facilitate “projects between government agencies and other 
organizations that promote the integration of telecommunications services, and encourages the 
proliferation of information through such projects.” Id. 
 125. Venezuelan TV Station, supra note 76.  
 126. Id. 
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opposition argument against regulation. 
The political opposition also pointed to the Chávez government’s 
continuous attempts to increase government influence over media. In 
August 2010, the government temporarily shut down the newspaper 6to 
Poder (“Sixth Power”) for publishing a photo montage of six prominent 
female officials dressed as cabaret dancers.127 Along with the violent 
photograph ban, this action suggested the government had extended its 
control over newspapers, despite the lack of clear publishing 
regulations.  
A bill proposed in 2009 would imprison journalists and 
broadcasters for up to four years for publishing “harmful” material that 
threatens “the peace, security and independence of the nation and the 
institutions of the state.”128 In June 2010, the government created the 
Center for Situational Studies of the Nation, which has broad powers in 
limiting the dissemination of information that it deems confidential.129 
These actions indicated the government’s willingness to expand control 
over the media, potentially a willingness to infringe upon freedoms of 
expression and information. On the whole, the various measures taken 
to restrict media, particularly privately owned opposition media, 
bolstered the view that the Chávez government overstepped its 
obligations and threatened the rights of Venezuelans.  
B. International Voices Supporting the Political Opposition Position  
International voices, such as global media outlets and human rights 
organizations, predominately favored the political opposition position, 
presenting government media regulation as harmful. Negative 
international responses to Chávez’s actions against the media included 
placing Venezuela on media watch lists,130 declaring that its media 
 
 127. The article was entitled “The Mighty Girls of the Revolution.” See El Universal, 
Venezuelan Government is Urged to Respect Free Media, EL UNIVERSAL (Aug. 31, 2011), 
available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/08/31/venezuelan-govt-is-urged-to-respect-free-
media.shtml. 
 128. Will Grant, Venezuela Mulls Tough Media Law, B.B.C. NEWS (July 31, 2009), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8177862.stm.  
 129. Venezuela: Close Chávez’s New Censorship Office, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 21, 
2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/21/venezuela-close-chavez-s-new-censorship-office. 
(“On June 1, 2010, President Hugo Chávez issued a presidential decree creating the Center for 
Situational Studies of the Nation (Centro de Estudio Situacional de la Nación, CESNA), which 
has broad powers to limit public dissemination of “information, facts or circumstance[s]” that it 
decides should be confidential.”). Human Rights Watch portrays this as the creation of a 
“censorship office,” claiming that broadly worded guidelines will allow for controlling and 
censoring public debate through the employment of criminal penalties. Id. 
 130. In October 2000, the International Press Institute placed Venezuela on its “Watch List” 
for threats to the freedom of the press, and the nation has been placed on the list several times 
since then. See Michael Kudlak, IPI Press Freedom Advocacy Mission Set to Visit Venezuela, 
INT’L. PRESS INST. (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.freemedia.at/our-
activities/missions/singleview/4608/. The International Press Institute (IPI) is a “global 
organization of editors, media executives and leading journalists dedicated to the protection of 
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status was “not free,”131 condemning actions like the violent photograph 
ban on a case-by-case basis,132 and holding conferences on the topic.133 
For example, Human Rights Watch declared, “[i]n its efforts to gain 
ground in this “media war,” the government has engaged in 
discriminatory actions against media airing opposition viewpoints, 
strengthened the state’s capacity to limit free speech, and created 
powerful incentives for government critics to engage in self-
censorship.”134  From the perspective of international organizations, the 
Chávez administration punished them for speaking out and reflecting 
dangers to Venezuelan media.135 Critics of the Chávez regulations 
consistently cited reactions by international organizations as indicative 
of threats to their rights by the government.136   
International law supplements domestic authority on media-related 
freedoms.137 Much like the views of domestic political opposition to 
Chávez, international advocacy on the media tends to be ideologically 
 
press freedom.” Id. They sent an “advocacy mission” to Venezuela in November 2009. Id. 
 131. The 2009 Freedom House Press Survey cited several factors related to an overall decline 
in press freedom. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96. Chief concerns include the “politicization 
of the judiciary, widespread corruption, harassment of the opposition, extensive self-censorship, 
and reprisals orchestrated by public officials.” Id. Among the dangerous restrictions on media are 
RESORTE’s vaguely worded provisions, harsh penalties for offensive material in insult laws, and 
denials of access to independent journalists at official ceremonies. Id. Past reports have also 
condemned the decline in press freedoms in Venezuela. See, e.g., id. (citing increased severity in 
punishments for disrespect (“descato”), insult laws, mandatory broadcasting of cadenas, direct 
assaults against journalists and media outlets, and government control over several media 
sources). 
 132. See Greenslade, supra note 93 (“The International Federation of Journalists has 
condemned the jail sentence and fine handed out to Venezuelan columnist Francisco Perez.”). 
Other organizations speaking out against the use of restraints and attacks upon the media include 
Reporters without Borders, the National Journalists’ Guild, and Human Rights Watch. 
 133. See El Universal, Freedom of the Press in Latin America Conference, EL UNIVERSAL 
(Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111118/freedom-of-
the-press-in-latin-america-conference. 
 134. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 64. 
 135. Journalists and organizational representatives have been subject to criminal 
investigations and prosecution and even forced to leave the country. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 57 (The Chávez administration has instigated criminal investigations of human rights 
organizations allegedly receiving funding from the United States as well as prosecuted several 
critics of the government. Nor has the government provided protection for human rights 
“defenders” receiving threats.). In reaction to Human Rights Watch’s Decade Under Chávez 
report, two journalists were thrown out of the country. FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 96.  
 136. See, e.g., El Universal, IAPA [Inter-American Press Association] Rejects Laws Affecting 
Free Speech in Venezuela and Ecuador, EL UNIVERSAL, Nov. 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111118/iapa-rejects-laws-affecting-free-speech-
in-venezuela-and-ecuador (opposition cites international press association view that draft law on 
Communication for People’s Power, which would allocate funds and provide equal assignment of 
official advertisements to community media, would infringe upon free speech). 
 137. International law has even been used in creating Venezuela’s law. “In enacting 
RESORTE, the Venezuelan National Assembly looked abroad for guidance. The Assembly 
studied legislation from seven countries as well as international human rights conventions 
containing freedom of expression and children rights provisions during the drafting period.” Soto, 
supra note 24, at 428. 
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democracy-driven.138 For instance, the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, signed by Venezuela in 2001, asserts that freedom of 
expression and the press are essential components of the exercise of 
democracy.139 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights called for 
preliminary protective measures in favor of privately owned media 
outlets, which the Venezuelan government refused to enforce.140 This 
authority questioned Chávez’s creation and use of domestic regulations 
against the media. 
C. Threats to Freedoms of Expression and Information 
Opposition and international advocates argued that the Chávez 
administration’s actions threatened the freedoms of expression and 
information for the press and the people. The violent photograph ban 
involved both the right to publish the image (expression) and the right 
of the people to know about crime and violence (information). The 
opposition maintained that the crucial development of a participatory 
democracy requires these freedoms.141  
The opposition responded to government regulation with 
complaints about rights. After government closure of the 6to Poder 
newspaper, opposition voices questioned the government’s interference 
and discussed effects upon freedom of expression.142 Opposition 
members regularly called for the need for information143 and intensified 
 
 138. See CANNON, supra note 29, at 113 (presenting democratic framework). 
 139. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). (“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”). 
 140. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Expression in International Law: Comparative Jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 379 (2006). The 
Venezuelan embassy has renounced the authority of this court, however. See Ministry of People’s 
Power for Foreign Affairs, IACHR Attempts to Impose its Decisions on Internal Affairs in 
Venezuela, EMBASSY OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA IN THE U.S. (Sept. 19, 
2011), available at http://venezuela-us.org/2011/09/19/iachr-attempts-to-impose-its-decisions-on-
internal-affairs-in-venezuela-2/ (“the government will proceed in denouncing the IACHR as an 
institution that constantly oversteps its functions and regularly makes decisions that are politically 
partial in nature and against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.”). 
 141. The preamble to the 1999 Constitution terms Venezuela a “democratic, participatory, 
and protagonistic society.” See Ellner & Hellinger, supra note 30, at 181, 187. Much of the 
debate about this ideal considers what respective levels of direct civic participation and 
representation should be present. Id. 
 142. See B.B.C. Mundo, ¿Qué Dice una Detención Sobre la Justicia y los Medios en 
Venezuela?, B.B.C. MUNDO (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.el-
nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/231774/BBC%20Mundo/¿Qué-dice-una-
detención-sobre-la-justicia-y-los-medios-en-Venezuela?. See also supra note 128 and 
accompanying text. 
 143. See Ender Ramírez Padrino and María Corina Machado, El Futuro de los Medios Será el 




296  Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:273 
 
 
debate.144 Often, these voices discussed freedom of the press 
concurrently with freedom of expression and the right to information.145 
In particular, opposition and international voices emphasized the need 
for improved investigative journalism in order to prevent corruption, 
promote democracy, and inform the people.146 Journalists cited legal, 
economic, and political constraints inside and outside of the newsroom, 
such as the lack of access to government documents and financial 
resources, warnings from editors and owners, and threats to their 
lives.147 In addition, the experiences of neighboring Latin American 
countries were cited as examples of how creating unjustifiable 
limitations upon the press can be a slippery slope.148 
Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution advocates for media-related 
freedoms by expressly granting rights of expression and information.149 
Article 57 of the Constitution proclaims, “Everyone has the right to 
express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or opinions orally, in writing or 
by any other form of expression, and to use for such purpose any means 
 
0Machado:%20El%20futuro%20de%20los%20medios%20será%20el%20respeto%20y%20el%2
0acceso%20a%20toda%20la%20información (speech by a MUD member and Deputy to the 
National Assembly, promising that newspapers will defend freedom of information); AVN, 
Defensora del Pueblo Instó a Medios a Cuidar el Manejo de Informaciones, EL NACIONAL (Aug. 
25, 2011), available at http://www.el-
nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php/comentar/www/files/comentar/p_contenido.php?q=nod
o/232257/Nación/Defensora-del-Pueblo-instó-a-medios-a-cuidar-el-manejo-de-informaciones 
(coverage encouraging accurate media reporting). 
 144. See Gustavo Méndez, “We, Venezuelans, are Fed Up with Polarization,” EL 
UNIVERSAL (Nov. 19, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
politica/111119/we-venezuelans-are-fed-up-with-polarization (president of Andrés Bello Catholic 
University (UCAB) and opposition supporter José Virtuoso calls for debate and dialogue, stating 
need for development of participatory democracy). 
 145. See Silvio Waisbord, The Challenges of Investigative Journalism, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
382 (2002).  
 146. Waisbord discusses investigative journalism’s role in Latin America democracies, 
including publicizing information about wrongdoing affecting public interest and increasing 
political accountability. Id. at 377. He contends, “press freedom could be understood as a set of 
conditions anchored in a set of laws and practices that strengthen the autonomy of news 
organizations and reporters.” Id. See also Reyes, supra note 39. 
 147. Id.; Waisbord, supra note 145, at 383 (citing external legal constraints including the lack 
of a right to information, right to reply laws of lack thereof, gag laws, insult and defamation, lack 
of independent judiciary, alongside political and economic constraints). 
 148. See Jairo E. Lanao, Legal Challenges to Freedom of Press in the Americas, 56 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 347 (2002). Lanao identifies several major limits upon Latin American press 
freedoms: the criminalization of speech, particularly through criminal libel and insult laws; 
licensing and privacy restrictions; and electoral bans. Id. Many of these limits are similar to, or 
more egregious than, those occurring in Venezuela. For example, the decades-long 
criminalization of speech in several countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, has led to 
consistent punishment of journalists in these nations. Id. at 356–58. One censorship-related issue 
in this context is the use of prior restraint to stop the dissemination of materials to the public. Id. 
at 360. These measures may threaten both individual and collective rights. Id. 
 149. Id. For background and analysis regarding the freedom of expression from an American 
perspective, see Steven Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and 
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1275 (1998). 
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of communication and diffusion, and no censorship shall be 
established.”150 Likewise, Article 58 provides, “Everyone has the right 
to timely, truthful and impartial information, without censorship.”151 
These provisions provide for the ideals cited by the opposition. 
However, difficulties with vagueness, lack of administrative guidelines 
and support, and adverse judicial interpretation limited absolute reliance 
on Constitutional provisions.152 Thus, the opposition needed to focus on 
new paradigms for promoting rights outside of the current domestic 
structure.153 For example, access to public information, would promote 
accountability, efficiency, and transparency in political, economic, and 
public administration spheres.154 The opposition viewpoint demanded 
the protection of both positive and negative freedoms for the people and 
the media.155  
The privately owned opposition media and international voices 
considered Chávez’s measures against the media to be threats to 
freedoms of expression and information, advancing the argument that 
regulations such as the violent photo ban were impermissible. This 
position called for reduced regulation and greater media freedoms. 
IV. REGULATION AND RIGHTS: BALANCING THE MEDIA WAR 
The conflicting positions presented in Parts II and III advocate for 
distinct approaches to media regulation. While the Chávez government 
position favored the power to create regulations, the opposition position 
feared government infringement upon freedoms. Both positions provide 
meaningful arguments for the future of Venezuelan media. On one 
hand, when Venezuela faces grave threats to the future of its children or 
 
 150. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 57. 
 151. Id. art. 58. During the constitutional assembly, Article 58 was one of the most 
controversial articles. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 33. Opponents read in a grant of power of the 
state to censor information that it determined to not be true or impartial. Id. In fact, in 1992, 
Venezuelan journalists blocked an effort by President Caldera to include a similar amendment. Id.  
 152. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 88, at 152. For example, the inability to identify the 
“truth” allows the government to control information-sharing and selectively punish the 
opposition. Id. The government is free to reject and even persecute for information that it claims 
to be in contravention of Article 58. Id. Brewer-Carias cites RESORTE and decisions of the 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice as examples of such government impropriety. Id.  
 153. See, e.g., John M. Ackerman and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of 
Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85 (2006) (surveying freedom of information 
laws from an administrative perspective, argue that freedom of information laws are essential to 
imposing accountability in new democracies). The authors link freedom of expression and 
freedom of information: “In order to form opinions that are worthy of being expressed, 
individuals must have access to relevant government information.” Id. at 88. “Citizens can only 
be considered to be fully informed and able to participate as democratic citizens if they are able to 
access the information held about them and on their behalf by the government.” Id.  
 154. Id. at 92.  
 155. Freedom of information may be best framed as a positive freedom and essential 
individual liberty requiring affirmative government action. Id. This would function in connection 
with negative freedoms such as the freedom to express without censorship and control. Id. at 90. 
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national stability, some protection may be necessary. On the other hand, 
extreme regulation may threaten basic human rights. A clear "win" by 
either side in the media war could be detrimental to the public. 
Ultimately, a balance between the two positions is integral in 
determining whether regulations such as the violent photo ban should be 
permissible.  
A. Emphasizing Extremes Endangers the Public Good 
Emphasizing either side of the media war to the exclusion of the 
other harms the public good. Both positions presented realistic concerns 
about the potential outcomes of domination by the other. While the 
Chávez government argued that media regulations such as the violent 
photo ban were necessary measures for protecting its citizenry, the 
opposition argued that such measures posed threats to freedoms of 
expression and information.156 Allowing one side to prevail over the 
other would endanger the people and pluralism. Therefore, a balance 
between the two positions is crucial.  
1. Prioritizing the People 
The well-being of Venezuelan citizens must be the paramount 
consideration when analyzing the competing positions.157 Actions such 
as the violent photo ban should be considered in the context of the 
tumultuous social problems in Venezuela, not just as a battle in an 
ongoing media war.158 The photo controversy arose at a time of extreme 
violence and social unrest.159 Violent crime, as so prominently displayed 
in the El Nacional photograph, threatens the lives of individual citizens 
and the stability of a society that has been called “more deadly than 
Iraq.”160  
A police study leaked in 2008 estimated that approximately ten 
thousand violent deaths occur each year in Venezuela.161 Studies in the 
past few years estimate that over fifty murders per 100 thousand 
Venezuelans are committed each year.162 Likewise, approximately two 
 
 156. See supra parts II and III. 
 157. See CANNON, supra note 29, at 130 (The media war “must be put into the broader 
context of contemporary Venezuelan society to be understood properly.”). 
 158. Focusing on drama, coups, demonstrations, and rhetoric wrongly deemphasizes 
“fundamental structural issues of economics, class, and polity.” Ellner & Hellinger, supra note 
30. 
 159. Romero, supra note 2 (citing an “unprecedented climb” in homicides over the past 
decade).  
 160. Romero, supra note 2 (citing contributing factors to the murder rates including a grim 
economic climate, the availability of “millions of illegal firearms,” and deficiencies in police 
control). See also Molinski, supra note 2 (discussing high homicide rates as well as the potential 
connection between the violent photograph and threats to society).  
 161. Molinski, supra note 2. 
 162. Molinski, supra note 2. See also Francisco Olivares, Factory of Violence, EL 
UNIVERSAL (Nov. 12, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-
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hundred homicides are committed per 100 thousand residents each year 
in the capital city of Caracas, where the gory photograph was taken.163 
Approximately ninety percent of murders are never solved, and the 
majority fail to result in even one arrest.164 While some claim that these 
numbers rose significantly since Chávez’s election in 1998, Chávez 
denied this.165 The lack of certain measurement demonstrates the patent 
need for both accurate information from the government and accurate 
reporting in the media.166 What is certain is that the violence portrayed 
in the banned photograph permeates Venezuelan society.167 Therefore, 
analysis of the media war must take violence into account.  
Citizens also face economic concerns.168 Venezuela’s economy has 
struggled since a decline in oil prices in the 1980s.169 By recent 
measurements, it is the only shrinking economy in South America.170 
Venezuela has the highest inflation rate in the Western hemisphere at 
 
politica/111112/factory-of-violence (providing similar estimates of 57 victims per 100,000 
residents, making Venezuela the second most violent nation on the continent—although this 
statistic comes from non-official sources and has been rejected by Chávez). 
 163. Romero, supra note 2. The city of Caracas has the second highest murder rate in the 
Western hemisphere. This compares to about 22.7 homicides per 100,000 people in Bogotá, 
Colombia’s capital, and 14 homicides per 100,000 in São Paulo, Brazil. 
 164. Id. One potential explanation is the low salaries paid to police officers. Some have 
turned to crimes and corruption to supplement their incomes. The Chávez government recently 
created a new security force, the Bolivarian National Police.  
 165. Compare Romero, supra note 2 (stating that "the judicial system has grown increasingly 
politicized, losing independent judges and aligning itself more closely with Mr. Chávez’s political 
movement and that many experienced state employees have had to leave public service, or even 
the country.”), with Olivares, supra note 163 (stating Chávez, who claims that he has decreased 
murder rates, declared, “The thought of Venezuela being one of the most dangerous countries in 
the world is untrue. And it is false that here there is more violence, compared with 11 years ago. 
Eh?”).  
 166. See AVN, PNB: Medios Privados Pretenden Crear una Percepción de Elevada 
Inseguridad, EL NACIONAL (Aug. 12, 2011), available at http://www.el-
nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php/ayuda/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/228573/Sucesos/PNB:-
Medios-privados-pretenden-crear-una-percepción-de-elevada-inseguridad (Director of Police 
complains that the private media advances a high perception of insecurity and attacks police, 
rather than discussing reductions in crime and homicide rates). The Chávez government has not 
published statistics on violent crime since 2003. See also Molinski, supra note 2. The government 
website fails to give homicide rates, although it does provide suicide statistics. 
 167. Recent surveys indicate that crime is the “preeminent” concern of Venezuelan citizens. 
Venezuelan Press Denounces Court Ban on Violent Images, supra note 4.  
 168. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 2 (“While many Latin American economies are growing 
fast, Venezuela’s has continued to shrink. The gap between rich and poor remains wide, despite 
spending on anti-poverty programs, fueling resentment.”). 
 169. Id. See Robert Plummer, What Now for Venezuela's Economy?, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 7, 
2012), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19813533?print=true. Venezuela has 
struggled with major economic problems including high inflation, currency devaluation, and 
external debt. 
 170. Simon Romero, In Venezuela, a New Wave of Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/world/americas/07venez.html?ref=venezuela 
(discussing the replacement of educated professionals leaving the country with an influx of 
immigrants drawn by loose immigration policies, the opportunity to make an income, and the 
availability of social welfare programs). 
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greater than thirty percent a year.171 Additionally, socioeconomic 
disparities between rich and poor citizens within the nation are 
striking.172 The top twenty percent of the population accounts for about 
fifty-two percent of all household incomes.173 As of 2005, less than five 
percent of the populace owned eighty percent of the nation’s land.174 At 
the same time, there is a large mass of chronically and severely poor.175 
These economic issues are likely to contribute to violence and overall 
instability, while also deeply affecting issues including children, 
national security, and the role of the media. 
The often conflicting positions of the privately owned opposition 
media and government take on greater significance when considered in 
light of these national concerns. Ultimately, both sides in the media war 
desired to solve these problems. Both sides considered the people a top 
priority, although each side focused upon different means towards this 
end. Chávez supporters considered the distribution of ownership and 
protection of vulnerable groups necessary, while the opposition found 
the government’s attempts harmful to negative and affirmative rights. 
These positions must be reconciled according to their common aim of 
aiding the people.  
2. Encouraging Political Pluralism, Not Polarization 
Supplanting polarization with pluralism would improve, and 
perhaps even eliminate, the Venezuelan media war. The role of the 
media vis-à-vis the Chávez administration was tumultuous; the 
conflicting positions in the media war not easily reconciled. 
Nevertheless, combining regulation and media freedom can provide a 
crucial mix of voices.  Moving forward, political pluralism will best be 
promoted by allowing room for both an active media and reasonable 
governmental regulation.  
Both the privately owned media and the Chávez administration 
represented politicized and individualized interests that would likely 
interfere with the Venezuelan public interest were they to gain absolute 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. The economic stratification in Venezuela is striking. 
(“With such a small group of very wealthy persons and a huge mass of chronically and severely 
poor, Venezuela’s income distribution is similar to that of traditionally wealthy yet politically 
corrupt nations of Africa and Asia and considerably more skewed than the United States and 
United Kingdom.”). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Clive Myrie, Revolution on Venezuela’s Estates, B.B.C. NEWS (Aug. 23, 2005), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4721961.stm. Having declared an “economic 
war” against the bourgeoisie, Chávez expropriated at least 207 private businesses in 2010, 
including banks, cattle ranches and housing developments, prompting many middle and upper 
class citizens to leave the country. See Romero, supra note 2.  
 175. PRESS REFERENCE, supra note 13. Although poverty rates worsened since he took 
office, Chávez has blamed crime and violence upon the high poverty rates in the time before he 
took office. See Molinski, supra note 2. 
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domination. In particular, the current polarization of the press is 
intertwined with ownership.176 On the one hand, the private media’s 
calls for freedom of expression and freedom of the press may be 
contradictory, as each demand for “autonomy of editors, publishers, and 
media owner . . . is often in reality a property claim disguised as a claim 
for free speech.”177 In a society with definite socioeconomic disparities, 
the lower and middle classes may require protection beyond those 
promoted by the freedom of expression for upper class media owners.178 
On the other hand, a publicly owned press does not necessarily lead to 
the representation of public voices.179 True pluralism in Venezuela’s 
media and society requires a “multiplicity of ideas and sources of 
information.”180  
Political diversity exists among the Venezuelan electorate, 
establishing the need for a matching multiplicity of information. For 
example, Chávez won presidential re-election in October 2012 with 
54% of the popular vote, with turnout at around 81%, while his chosen 
political successor, Nicolas Maduro, won 50.7% of the vote in the April 
2013 election.181 Although these close results showed practical threats to 
Chávez and his party’s power, his party still holds considerable support, 
since it maintained about half of the popular vote.182  
Another strong example of political pluralism in Venezuela was 
the failure of sixty-nine Constitutional reforms proposed by Chávez.183 
 
 176. See supra notes 38–41, 114–115, and accompanying text. 
 177. CANNON, supra note 29, at 126.  
 178. Enhancing opposition media protection could reinforce the gap between rich and poor 
rather than promoting collective betterment. In 2003, foreign minister, Roy Chaderton, 
“complained that the media are immune from the electoral process,” claiming that “in Venezuela, 
you can disagree with the military, religious leaders, intellectuals and politicians, but never dare 
to challenge the holders of media concessions.” Venezuela’s Media War, supra note 21. 
 179. If the goal is a pluralistic and people-controlled media, maybe truly public television 
channels would help. WILPERT, supra note 30, at 24.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Hugo Chávez celebrates re-election in Venezuela, B.B.C. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19867445; Chávez heir Maduro 
wins Venezuela presidential election, B.B.C. NEWS (Apr. 15, 2013), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22149202. In a legislative election on September 
26, 2010, opposition party members won approximately one-third of the National Assembly seats 
and almost half of the popular vote. Simon Romero, Shift in Venezuelan Politics as Chávez’s 
Opposition Reclaims Seats in Legislature, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/americas/28venez.html (“In practical terms, the seats 
won by the opposition enable it to block critical legislation and play a role in determining the 
makeup of important bodies like the Supreme Court, now packed with the president’s 
supporters.”). This election took place about a month after the violent photo ban was issued. 
 182. Id. Additionally, the opposition does not consist of a single party, as compared to 
Chávez’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, which is the nation’s largest. Id. “No 
other party rivals [Chávez’s] in its nationwide reach. No party has at its disposal the resources of 
the federal government.” Id. Furthermore, “no other politician is so identified with efforts to lift 
the poor and to include them in politics.” Id. 
 183. The proposed amendments included ones allowing Chávez to create new administrative 
regions, the power to declare unlimited states of emergency, and the ability to re-run for election 
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In December 2007, the referendum narrowly failed in a popular 
election—with fifty-one percent of citizens voting “no”—demonstrating 
increased political support for the opposition but also ongoing support 
for Chávez’s reforms.184 Perhaps most importantly, this political defeat 
verified the existence of political pluralism in Venezuela, assuaging 
fears of an authoritarian dictatorship and demonstrating the media’s 
responsibility to represent varying viewpoints.185 
Political pluralism is one of the “superior values of [Venezuela’s] 
legal order.”186 News sources, both public and private, serve a 
significant role in the Venezuelan political process.187 Each side 
provides information and views that the other may not, which leads to 
greater public knowledge and debate.188 Both sides effectively use mass 
media to attract and mobilize voters during elections and in other 
political events.189 The most important voice, however, is that of the 
people because they are unlikely to see issues as purely black or white.  
Despite Venezuela’s political diversity, the polarization 
represented by both sides of the media war harms the people. Many 
media sources in Venezuela may in fact amplify the social polarization 
between the poor and privileged by pandering towards specific 
viewpoints and classes.190 Divided parties should constructively work 
 
indefinitely. Simon Romero, Venezuela Vote Sets Roadblocks on Chávez Path, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/world/americas/04venezuela.html?_r=1.  
 184. Id. During the referendum debate, the opposition and international media framed the 
proposed reforms as a “putative attack on private property” and an attempt to expand 
authoritarian power. BRUCE, supra note 34, at 177. From the socialist Chávez perspective, the 
core objective of the referendum was increasing popular power. Id. 
 185. Romero, supra note 183 (“For nine years, a combination of populist politics and rising 
oil prices have propelled Mr. Chávez’s socialist program for Venezuela with an almost inexorable 
momentum. On Sunday, his country put on the brakes. Those results have at once given the 
opposition a sudden boost and demonstrated the resilience of Venezuela’s institutions.”). See 
Vincent Bevins, A Failed Reform, Chávez, and Democracy in Venezuela, LEFT TURN (Jan. 18, 
2010) http://www.leftturn.org/failed-reform-ch%C3%A1vez-and-democracy-venezuela 
(“Chávez’ proposed constitutional reform was far from the cynical power grab it was portrayed as 
in the U.S. press . . . . the result has finally forced recognition that Venezuelan elections are free 
and transparent, and that Mr. Chávez is not, and has never been, a dictator. Dictators do not lose 
elections.”). 
 186.  Constitution, supra note 54, art. 2 (“Venezuela constitutes itself as a Democratic and 
Social State of Law and Justice, which holds as superior values of its legal order and actions those 
of life, liberty, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, social responsibility and, in general, the 
preeminence of human rights, ethics and political pluralism.”). 
 187. Although the nation “has been polarized between Chávez’s supporters and detractors, 
Venezuela still enjoys a vibrant public debate in which anti-government and pro-government 
media are equally vocal in their criticism and defense of Chávez.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 57, at 64. 
 188. The privately owned media essentially leads the opposition fight against Chávez in place 
of a cohesive political opposition. See Venezuela’s Media War, supra note 23 (“Government 
sympathizers accuse the private media of leading the fight against the “Bolivarian Revolution” in 
the absence of a credible and united political opposition.”).  
 189. See Ellner & Hellinger, supra note 30, at 48. 
 190. Id. at 49. 
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together towards building a better media for the people instead of 
combating one another.191 Political pluralism will best be upheld by 
embracing public debate in the media rather than by giving full 
credence to either position in the media war. 
On the whole, the interests and influence of each position in the 
Venezuelan media war demand a balance rather than a grant of 
unfettered power to either side. If the government uses regulation purely 
to censor political opposition, the democratic structure of the nation will 
be threatened. Alternatively, some power to regulate must be granted to 
the government, as the politicized role of the media calls for reasonable 
limits in order to protect the citizenry. Political pluralism, which is 
integral to the public good, will be maintained if each position in the 
media war retains a public voice. 
3. International Coverage and Existing Frameworks Are Inadequate  
As international analysis dominates much of the discourse on 
Venezuela’s media war, the equally polarized, politicized nature of 
international coverage requires skepticism.192 The United States 
government supported political opposition to Chávez, most notably 
though substantial funding of opposition-aligned campaigns in privately 
owned media.193 Negative framing by major U.S. media sources 
reflected this bias by tending to distort coverage of Venezuela.194 Other 
international actors more sympathetic to the Chávez administration 
 
 191. In speeches Chávez has “demonized his media critics as “facists,” “terrorists,” “enemies 
of the people,” “liars,” “coup-mongers,” “immoral,” “trash,” and “laboratories of psychological 
warfare.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 72. The opposition has also participated in 
name-calling. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57. This rhetoric is likely to be 
counterproductive from either side, as it does not address the real issues at stake. 
 192. Admittedly, this may require greater scrutiny of many of the sources cited in this article. 
 193. The United States government has long provided funding to Venezuelan media that 
supports the aims of the opposition. For example, during the oil industry shutdown in 2002 and 
2003, USAID/DAI provided $10,000 for a media campaign supporting the strikers. WILPERT, 
supra note 30, at 172. More recently, United States embassy cables published by Wikileaks 
exposed the close relationship between the U.S. and Venezuela’s private media. See Tamara 
Pearson, Wikileaks Cables Reveal U.S. Embassy Works with Venezuelan Private Media, 
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Sept. 6, 2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/6469. The U.S. 
ambassador to Venezuela met with representatives from El Nacional, Globovision, and the 
Cisneros Group to discuss political content and U.S. funding. According to a Chávez supporter, 
“[f]or 2011, the U.S congress approved a multimillion budget in order to transmit the thirty 
minute program five days a week in Venezuela, supposedly to counteract the anti-US propaganda 
by the Venezuelan government.” Additionally, recently declassified U.S. State Department 
documents show that the U.S. government funded over $4 million to private media and during 
2008-10, as part of a more comprehensive $40 million investment in Venezuelan opposition 
through agencies including the Panamerican Development Foundation (PADF), Freedom House, 
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Golinger, supra note 36. 
 194. Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations, 
supra note 41 (“The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal broadly 
report on and reinforce the negative frames on Venezuela that serve as a basis for debates over 
U.S. policy towards the country.”). 
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supported his actions in regards to media.195 Overall, the international 
response to media-related regulation and rights only amplified political 
polarization during Chávez’s time in power.196 Accordingly, the 
Venezuelan people, instead of outside voices, should control their 
media’s future.197   
Likewise, frameworks for assessing and aspiring to improve media 
may not adequately address the needs of the Venezuelan people.198 
Many models are based purely on “democratic” ideals that do not 
entirely account for Venezuela’s dynamic political structure and 
consistently choose rights over regulation.199 For example, the Fourth 
Estate model aspires to an independent press that fulfills its duty to 
publish information related to the public interest, thus promoting 
government accountability and monitoring democratic institutions.200 
The informed citizenry model also focuses upon the freedom of 
information. It considers public access to accurate information a 
“primary condition of democratic life.”201 While the principles behind 
these frameworks are useful, Venezuelan media should be analyzed 
under a model that considers Venezuela’s current capabilities and 
socialist aims alongside democratic values. 
Other models address the issues of ownership and popular 
participation in the press. For example, Herman and Chomsky’s 
propaganda model questions the impartiality of profit-driven private 
media.202 Public interest, also known as “Pigouvian,” theory favors 
 
 195. See B.B.C., Argentina Gives Hugo Chávez Press Freedom Award, B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 
29, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12902155 (Argentine 
University of La Plata gave Chávez an award for efforts to break “media monopolies” and 
“support popular communication.”). 
 196. Furthermore, the United States, like the Venezuelan government, seems to find limits on 
acceptable expression. On television Chávez held up photographs of victims of the United States 
bombing of Afghanistan and called it a “slaughter of innocents.” ELLNER, supra note 33, at 198. 
As a result, the U.S. temporarily withdrew its Ambassador, while Colin Powell voiced his doubts 
about Venezuela’s “democratic understanding.” Id. 
 197. See, e.g., Edward Ellis, Missing the Point: Media Speculations Over Venezuela, 
VENEZUELANALYSIS (Sep. 12, 2011), http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/64836483197 
(pointing to the dearth of international coverage on the creation of a new regional alliance, the 
Community of Latin American States (CELAC)). 
 198. This discussion does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of media frameworks; 
instead, it provides examples of existing frameworks. 
 199. Whether Venezuela should be considered a socialist or democratic nation is beyond the 
scope of this article; however, polarization in the media clearly reflects divergent political 
ideologies. 
 200. See, e.g., JULIANNE SCHULTZ, REVIVING THE FOURTH ESTATE: DEMOCRACY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE MEDIA (1998).  
 201. Waisbord, supra note 145, at 381. See also Mark Bovens, Information Rights: 
Citizenship in the Information Society, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 317 (2002); Alasdair Roberts, Structural 
Pluralism and the Right to Information, 51 TORONTO L.J. 259 (2001) (framing the right to 
freedom of information as a basic right of political participation). 
 202. See EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (Pantheon Books, 1988) (framework for analyzing 
propaganda nature of media considers ownership, funding, sourcing, flak, and anti-communist 
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government ownership of the media and treatment of information as a 
public good.203 Public choice theory, on the other hand, supposes that 
government-owned media is detrimental to society.204 Finally, 
Habermas’ public sphere model calls for societal pluralism and full 
participation.205 Ultimately, the macro-economic nature of these models 
fails to account for the day-to-day concerns of the Venezuelan people, 
or contemplate more nuanced control and ownership over the media.  
Thus, current frameworks for assessing media are limited. Each 
model chooses between regulation and rights, or provides for ownership 
by only one segment of society. Both perspectives in Venezuela’s media 
war, however, possess strong rationales and goals favoring 
advancement of the Venezuelan people. The needs of the Venezuelan 
people will not be served by adopting the views of either extreme. 
Therefore, Venezuelan media should be analyzed using a distinct 
framework that balances necessary government regulation against 
fundamental rights. 
B. Balancing Best Promotes the Public Good 
Resorting to either extreme in the media war would lead to 
problematic results; thus, analysis of Venezuela’s media war requires 
balancing.206 Promoting the public good necessitates a combination of 
both regulations, offsetting the powerful privately owned media, and 
established rights, preventing governmental abuse. Such a framework is 
ideal for Venezuela for several reasons. First, a balancing framework 
allows for reasonable government regulation and action. Second, a 
balancing framework accounts for the rights at stake. Ultimately, the 
balance framework measures rights and regulation according to the 
needs of the Venezuelan people. This contextual analysis provides the 
requisite flexibility necessary to account for Venezuela’s dynamic 
nature. While this analysis is especially useful for considering 
Venezuelan media, it can be used in considering any governmental 
 
ideology). 
 203. Djankov et al., supra note 38, at 341–42 (Public interest theory believes that 
governments maximize consumer welfare, looking at information as public good, with strong 
increasing returns due to low marginal costs of dissemination, and public exposure to accurate 
and unbiased information.). 
 204. Id. Public choice theory theorizes that government ownership “would distort and 
manipulate information to entrench the incumbent politicians, preclude voters and consumers 
from making informed decisions, and ultimately undermine both democracy and markets;” it also 
advocates for media’s role as a fourth estate providing extra checks and balances. Id. 
 205. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1962, English Translation 1989). See 
also CANNON, supra note 29, at 126. 
 206. A case-by-case inquiry into whether the Chávez administration’s stated objectives 
outweigh the limitations on freedoms of expression and information would likely be unworkable 
and subjective, and may also lead to the problematic consequences of allowing one side to 
prevail.  
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regulation or action regarding the media.  
Domestic and international laws, whether binding or merely 
aspirational, all advocate for a balance between regulation and rights. 
For instance, Articles 57,207 58,208 and 60209 of the 1999 Constitution 
guarantee basic rights to free speech, expression, and information 
alongside references to accompanying responsibilities and restraints.210 
The first sentence of Article 58 is telling: “Communications are free and 
plural, and involve the duties and responsibilities indicated by law.”211 
While this provision grants “free and plural” communication rights, 
they remain subject to legal regulation through “duties and 
responsibilities indicated by law.” Similarly, RESORTE Article 6(2) 
asserts “censorship is prohibited, without prejudice to the duty of the 
State to establish further responsibilities arising from the exercise of 
freedom of expression and information in accordance with the 
Constitution and the law.”212 Overall, these domestic laws balance 
recognition and restraint of the Chávez government and privately owned 
opposition media’s conflicting positions. 
International law reflects and expounds upon the balancing 
principles of Venezuela’s domestic law. Venezuela is a long-time 
member of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and 
the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
 207. Article 57 reads, “Everyone has the right to express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or 
opinions orally, in writing or by any other form of expression, and to use for such purpose any 
means of communication and diffusion, and no censorship shall be established. Anyone making 
use of this right assumes full responsibility for everything expressed. Anonymity, war 
propaganda, discriminatory messages or those promoting religious intolerance are not permitted. 
Censorship restricting the ability of public officials to report on matters for which they are 
responsible is prohibited.” Constitution, supra note 54, art. 57.  
 208. Article 58 reads, “Communications are free and plural, and involve the duties and 
responsibilities indicated by law. Everyone has the right to timely, truthful and impartial 
information, without censorship, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution, as well as 
the right to reply and corrections when they are directly affected by inaccurate or offensive 
information. Children and adolescents have the right to receive adequate information for purposes 
of their overall development.” Id. art. 58. 
 209. Article 60 provides, “Every person is entitled to protection of his or her honor, private 
life, intimacy, self-image, confidentiality and reputation. The use of electronic information shall 
be restricted by law in order to guarantee the personal and family intimacy and honor of citizens 
and the full exercise of their rights.”  Id. art. 59. 
 210. Id. (establishing the right to express religious beliefs); Id. art. 61 (granting the right to 
expression in one’s “freedom of conscience”). Soto finds that Articles 57 and 58 establish “five 
basic rights related to freedom of expression. These five guarantees can be summarized as 
follows: (i) the right to freely express thoughts, (ii) the right to communicate or obtain 
information, (iii) the right to establish and develop communicational media, (iv) the right to 
receive timely, truthful, and impartial information without censorship, and (v) the right to reply to 
adverse information expressed against oneself.” The existence of rights, however, does not mean 
these rights are absolute. Soto, supra note 24, at 413. 
 211. Constitution, supra note 54, art. 58. 
 212. LEY RESORTE, supra note 48. Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión 
[Social Responsibility on Radio and Television Act], La Gaceta Oficial N° 38.081 [Official 
Gazette No. 38.081] art. 6(2) (Dec. 7, 2004) (Venez.). 
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(ICCPR), both of which call for balance.213 The 1999 Constitution 
confers preeminent legal status upon such “conventions relating human 
rights.”214 As an example, the ACHR expressly establishes the “right to 
freedom of thought and expression.”215 This right is balanced alongside 
other integral concerns. While the right “shall not be subject to prior 
censorship, [the exercise of the right] shall be subject to subsequent 
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to 
the extent necessary to ensure” adherence to enumerated categories.216 
These categories include “the protection of national security”217 and the 
“moral protection of childhood and adolescence,”218 the chief objectives 
utilized in the Chávez government’s argument for the use of 
regulations.219  
Likewise, the ICCPR upholds every person’s “right to freedom of 
expression.”220 This right is qualified, however, by “special duties and 
responsibilities.”221 The ICCPR identifies the preservation of national 
security as one permissible justification for legal regulations.222 On the 
whole, the nuanced approach of both Conventions, like other 
 
 213. Venezuela became a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights in 
November 1969. See generally Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Organización de 
los Estados Americanos [Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of 
American States], Informe Annual de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechoes Humanos 1977 
[Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1977] (1978), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/77sp/sec.1.htm [hereinafter American Convention on Human 
Rights]. Venezuela signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in June 1969 
and ratified it in May 1978. See U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at  http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html (last visited Nov. 
30, 2010). 
 214. “The treaties, pacts and conventions relating human rights which have been executed 
and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal legislation, insofar 
as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment and exercise of such rights that are more 
favorable than those established by this Constitution amid the laws of the Republic, and shall be 
immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs of the Public Power.” 
Constitution, supra note 54, art. 23  
 215. “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s 
choice.” American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 213, art. 13(1). 
 216. Id. art. 13(2).  
 217. Id. art. 13(2)(b) (“the protection of national security, public order, or public health or 
morals”). 
 218. Id. art. 13(4) (“[P]ublic entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the 
sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and 
adolescence.”). See also Soto, supra note 24, at 414 (discussing this provision of the Convention). 
 219. See supra Part II.  
 220. “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 213, art. 19, ¶ 2. 
 221. Id. art. 19, ¶ 3. 
 222. Id. art. 19, ¶ 2-3 (“For the protection of national security or of public order (order 
public), or of public health or morals.”). 
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international law, recognizes both rights and reasonable regulation. 
Moreover, the opposition media’s desire to protect rights should be 
balanced with the Chávez government’s desire to establish regulations, 
as Venezuelan and international law support both positions. 
Looking forward, balancing the conflicting positions in the media 
war will best uphold political pluralism and advance the public interest 
if each side operates reasonably.223 Moderation in both reporting and 
regulating will encourage and aid in balancing.224 Journalists225 and 
Venezuelans alike226 desire impartiality and de-politicization in the 
news.227 The government, opposition, and media should work towards a 
more active and informed society that is distanced from political 
polarization.228 These necessary governmental regulations should be 
carefully crafted so as to not arbitrarily or excessively threaten rights.229 
The Chávez administration,230 opposition members,231 and other 
 
 223. See supra Part IV(A) (advocating for political pluralism rather than the exclusion of one 
side in the media war). 
 224. Although some politicization is likely to remain a major factor in the media war, 
increased neutrality in both reporting and regulating will benefit the debate. Additionally, 
regulations should restrain government sources, not only privately owned opposition sources.  
 225. Most journalists, who would be most effective free of politic influence, “are caught in 
the crossfire between media owners and the government.” CANNON, supra note 29, at 130. 
 226. “Venezuelans would welcome some sort of non-political controls on all sectors of the 
media industry to ensure greater impartiality and balance in reporting.” Venezuela’s Media War, 
supra note 21. “The public [has] come to understand only too well the dangers of distortion.” Id. 
 227. Potential solutions that could enhance the agenda setting, watchdog, and gatekeeper 
functions of press include public access laws, more resources and enforcement, and better 
journalism training. Waisbord, supra note 145, at 383.  
 228. In considering the media’s rights and responsibilities, it may be helpful to consider the 
“long-held position that the national media . . . bore a public obligation to serve the national good 
and to work in cooperation with the government to improve social conditions.” PRESS 
REFERENCE, supra note 13, at 7. “Venezuela’s media, including state TV, needs tough controls to 
ensure diversity, balance and access, enforced at arms’ length from political powers.” Klein, 
supra note 39. This may require “a broader effort to ‘democratize the media’ so that it reflects 
viewpoints that were largely excluded from the commercial media in the past.” HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 57, at 64. 
 229. “[U]nder international norms on freedom of expression, broadcasting regulations must 
be precisely defined in order to avoid overbroad or arbitrary interpretation by officials that 
constrain free expression and the public’s access to information and opinion.” Id. at 64–65. 
Human Rights Watch maintains that phrases like “integral education of the children” may be 
overbroad and could infringe upon freedom of speech. Id.  
 230. More than 60 television stations and 250 grassroots radio and print operations have been 
established since Chávez came to power in 1999. Tamara Pearson, The People Legislate: 
Grassroots Media Movement Creates Its Own Law, VENEZUELANALYSIS (June 24, 2010), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6297. See also WILPERT, supra note 30, at 187 (Community 
outlets “have been sprouting up throughout the country in recent years, are acting as a catalyst, 
spreading the word about what changes are still needed and also educating people in the poor 
neighborhoods about what changes are being made and how they can get involved.”). 
 231. See Carolina García Aparicio, MUD Presenta Propuestas Para Proyecto de Ley de 
Medios Comunitarios, EL NACIONAL (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.el-nacional.com/www/site/p_contenido.php?q=nodo/227911/Nación/MUD-presenta-
propuestas-para-contrucción-de-proyecto-de-Ley-de-medios-comuntarios (Venez.) (draft law for 
community media from opposition coalition). 
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Venezuelans232 have already envisioned and implemented some 
community-based media reforms well-suited to the balancing 
framework. Further implementation of people-controlled grassroots and 
community-based media would be ideal.233  
The balancing framework is especially useful when applied to the 
expansion of novel media forms. In fact, the nature of the Internet may 
necessitate balancing while providing a unique outlet for popular 
participation.234 The use of social media networks by the Venezuelan 
people, government, and opposition exploded in recent years.235 The 
individual-driven nature of the Internet makes it an ideal outlet for 
pursuing the goals of the people, as it allows for an equal opportunity to 
broadcast and express ideas. Additionally, increased peer-to-peer 
communication is essential to the new socialism.236 The balancing 
analysis can be used as the government creates new regulations.237 In 
connection with the expansion of news on the Internet, the impending 
likelihood of globalization encourages better development of a strong 
Venezuela-based media.238 
In conclusion, the Venezuelan media war should be analyzed 
according to a balancing analysis. Shared domestic and international 
 
 232. For example, a group of people recently proposed a new legal framework for regulating 
grassroots media, encompassing aspects, which include licensing, sustainability, and organizing. 
See Pearson, supra note 230. Participants cited the need for media “that doesn’t see news and 
information as something that is bought and sold,” along with observing that “[t]hose who control 
the media, control culture.” 
 233. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 24. 
 234. See Aliana Gonzalez, Power in the Hands of Citizen Participation, EL UNIVERSAL (May 
16, 2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/2011/05/16/power-in-the-hands-of-citizen-
participation.shtml (discussing rapidly changing communication and the people’s increased 
control over journalism). 
 235. See Hugo Chávez Frias on Twitter, http://twitter.com/#!/Chávezcandanga (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2011); Reardon, Perez & Duque, supra note 32 (“I think as Venezuelans have learned to 
be more discerning, to inform ourselves by taking on the role of investigator through social media 
networks such as twitter and facebook so as to keep ourselves informed in light of the serious 
lack of information regarding the different difficulties our country is facing.”); Rafael Rodriguez, 
Venezuelans Followed Opposition Debate Through Social Networks, EL UNIVERSAL (Nov. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/111116/venezuelans-
followed-opposition-debate-through-social-networks (noting Venezuelan’s high usage of social 
networking, including during opposition political debates). 
 236. See WILPERT, supra note 30, at 224.  
 237. A newly amended version of RESORTE adds Internet media regulation to television and 
radio controls. See International Media Dep’t. – MINCI, Reform of the Social Responsibility in 
Media Law: 4 Questions & 4 Answers, VENEZUELANALYSIS (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5914. See also B.B.C. Mundo, El Mapa de la Censura en 
Internet y la Guerra de los Pagos, B.B.C. MUNDO (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/02/110217_1421_breves_tecnologia_opennet_interne
t_apple_google_dc.shtml (showing that no Internet censorship is currently taking place in 
Venezuela). 
 238. Except for Grupo Cisneros, so far “globalization of the media appears to have bypassed 
Venezuela altogether.” While corporations including Sony and HBO have Caracas officers, they 
are largely separate from local media. Besides Cisneros, there is little to no foreign investment in 
Venezuela’s media. Mayobre, supra note 26, at 182–83. 
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law principles commit to a balance between rights and regulation. 
Reasonable regulations consistent with Venezuela’s legal framework 
should be accomplished without eliminating citizens’ freedoms of 
expression and information. In addition, proponents of each position in 
the media war should strive to act reasonably. The combination of a 
balanced approach to the media war and attempts to improve the quality 
of public debate will prioritize the Venezuelan people, promote political 
pluralism, and allow both positions to “win” the media war. 
C. Balance and the Violent Photograph Ban 
Finally, this part applies the balance approach to the violent photo 
ban in order to exemplify this approach’s superiority. Freedom to 
publish images subject to reasonable regulation promotes the most 
favorable results for the government, privately owned opposition media, 
and the Venezuelan people. Rather than simply focusing on whether this 
particular ban was reasonable, however, it must be considered in the 
greater political and social context. 
Accounting for each position’s argument, the violent photograph 
ban could be classified as either a reasonable regulation or a threat to 
rights. The government maintained the position that the ban was a 
necessary regulation to uphold the dual objectives of protecting children 
and preserving national security.239  On one hand, allowing the privately 
owned opposition media to gratuitously publish gruesome images could 
harm children and national security. On the other hand, privately owned 
opposition media and international organizations portrayed the ban as a 
threat to rights.240 Allowing the Venezuelan government free rein to 
regulate which photographs are published by the media could lead to 
unjustifiable censorship and the infringement of freedoms of expression 
and information. Each side presents realistic concerns about the other. 
Allowing either side to prevail by concluding that one position has a 
superior ban-related argument could lead to problematic and 
unsatisfactory outcomes for society.241 By giving credence to each 
position, while prioritizing the public good, a balancing analysis is the 
best approach to the ban.  
The violent photo ban should be considered in the greater political 
 
 239. See supra Part II (discussing these two stated government objectives). The government 
could make basic arguments alleging the ban’s reasonableness. Even in its original form, the ban 
was only for the next 30 days. It was further restricted as a punitive measure for the two papers 
which had published the photo. The ban only targeted gruesome photos like the one originally 
published.  
 240. See supra Part III (discussing other actions against the press and potential threats to 
freedom of expression and information). The opposition could argue that banning photographs for 
the next 30 days essentially restricted publishing until the September 26 elections. In addition, the 
ban could force self-censorship by the media.  
 241. See Part IV(a) (proposing that favoring one side to the exclusion of the other would 
damage political pluralism and therefore the public good). 
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context. Both the publishing of the photo and the court decision 
coincided with upcoming legislative elections, which took place on 
September 26, 2010, about a month after the ban was declared.242 The 
elections were a threat to Chávez’ immediate power over the National 
Assembly, as well as an early indicator of the 2012 presidential 
election.243 They were also an opportunity for the political opposition to 
gain greater political power and momentum.244 While the government 
claimed that the photograph published in El Nacional and Tal Cual was 
an effort to gain voters before the election,245 the opposition and 
international critics claimed that the resulting ban was an effort to 
silence the media and shield itself before the election.246 Both claims 
against the opposing side involved underlying political motivation.247 
The opposition argued that it was simply educating the citizenry about 
the reality of violence in the nation, while the government argued that it 
was protecting children and preserving national security.248 Both stated 
rationales were supported by factors other than political motivation. 
Nevertheless, the political context is a relevant factor in assessing the 
ban.  
Even while considering the politicized nature of the debate over 
the photo ban, important underlying social issues are easily overlooked. 
A balanced analysis accounts for factors such as medium249 and 
emotional impact,250 including the particularly visceral impact of the 
photograph and the newspapers in which it was published. Nevertheless, 
the focus extends beyond the photograph itself. The photograph ban, 
albeit indicative of a greater war between the government and privately 
owned opposition media, is most meaningful in the context of the social 
and economic situation in Venezuela.251  
 
 242. Romero, supra note 170.  
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. Examples of significant legislative control include the ability to block legislation and 
choose Supreme Court officials. 
 245. See Venezuela Ban on Violent Images Fuels Censorship Row, supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See Molinski, supra note 2. 
 248. Id. 
 249. On symbolic speech, see James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from 
Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2008). See also ELLNER, supra note 33, at 129. Photographs 
may be especially significant for the opposition, as they provide a clear and unified message that 
the opposition struggles with rhetorically. Id. at 131. 
 250. See Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, Staring Death in the Face During Times of War: 
When Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity of Authenticity, 25 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2011) (focusing upon wartime need for images and 
suggests using internet to post questionable images. “Photos are trickier than words, because their 
content is in large measure emotional, visceral, and because you can’t edit their content.”); Clay 
Calvert, Voyeur War? The First Amendment, Privacy and Images from the War on Terrorism, 15 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 147 (2004). 
 251. See supra notes 120–136 and accompanying text. 
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Public debate should focus on the greater societal issues 
represented by the photograph of dead bodies at the morgue.252 The 
newspapers published the photograph as a protest to the violence 
plaguing Venezuela, and the government’s reaction acknowledged the 
existence of social unrest. Nevertheless, the ban became one narrow 
battle in a broader media war. By focusing on such narrow battles, both 
positions allow their conflict to override healthy public debate on the 
issues. While media freedoms and the government’s need for regulation 
must both be respected, considerations of the public good must define 
the balance of these conflicting forces. Thus, pluralism would best be 
served by a truly public discussion of the societal issues presented by 
the photograph.253 Instead of escalating polarization, the media and 
government should provide public forums with a view towards creating 
mutually beneficial solutions for the people. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Article proposes the novel use of a balancing 
approach in analyzing the relative roles of media regulation and rights 
protection. During Chávez’s fourteen years in office, numerous 
domestic and international voices stressed the conflicts between media 
regulation and freedoms of expression and information. Moreover, most 
theoretical media models entail choosing between regulation and rights. 
This article recommends reconciling the government and opposition 
media positions in Venezuela’s media war through use of a new 
theoretical framework that balances reasonable regulation and rights 
protection. As the violent photo ban demonstrates, both the Chávez 
government and privately owned opposition media presented 
meaningful arguments, however, neither position should prevail to the 
exclusion of the other. A theoretical balancing framework allows for 
both reasonable regulation and rights protection. Instead of escalating 
the media war, balance encourages both positions to focus upon the 
public good. As Venezuela begins a new era without Chávez, this 
approach should be used in that nation and others to assess and 
reconcile government regulation and rights protections.  
 
 
 252. See Romero, supra note 2 (“Given the government’s stance in these cases, many here 
worry it is focusing on the messenger, not the underlying message.”).  
 253. See, e.g., Golinger, supra note 36 (Journalist Alberto Nolia, who often criticized 
political opposition to Chávez, suggested that “children are not stupid, they know what’s going 
on. Perhaps it would be better to publish images of people killed by violent crime with 
explanations about who they were and the fact that now their lives are over, so that kids will 
understand the severity of delinquency . . . the problem of crime in Venezuela is very serious.”). 
